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Antisubordination of Whom? 
What India's Answer Tells Us About 
the Meaning of Equality in 
Affirmative Action 
Sean A. Pager* 
Who should be the beneficiaries of race-conscious affirmative action? 
This rarely asked question serves to illuminate a larger debate over the 
nature of equality. Neither of two competing paradigms of equal 
protection - antidiscrimination and antisubordination - offers a 
satisfactory method to select beneficiaries. The Supreme Court's current 
antidiscrimination approach focuses myopically on underrepresentation in 
particular contexts: it tells us to count heads, but not who gets counted. 
This latter inquiry hinges on a societal understanding of race that 
antidiscrimination theory is unable to supply. By contrast, India offers a 
working example of an antisubordination approach in which the 
eradication of societal hierarchies is the explicit goal of affirmative action. 
Yet, higher rates of social mobility and immigration make India's model 
unlikely to translate to the U.S. context. Appreciating the shortcomings of 
each of these paradigms on their own paves the way for an integrated 
understanding of equality in which antisubordination values give 
normative content to antidiscrimination doctrine. India's example also 
proVides the basis for a clearer allocation of responsibility between the 
judiciary and the political branches on questions of race. 
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thanks are due to Robert Post, Clark Cunningham, Mark Tushnet, Kathy Abrams, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Have slavery and segregation left no fingerprints? When Justice 
O'Connor wrote in Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co. that the effects of 
societal discrimination are "inherently unmeasurable,'" this apparent 
whitewashing of history confirmed many commentators' worst 
suspicions about the Rehnquist Court. To them, Croson's holding 
disregarded rampant racial inequalities and flew in the face of the 
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 Moreover, the 
effective muzzling of affirmative action accomplished in Croson 
seemed to herald an ideology of "color-blindness" that placed in 
jeopardy three decades of civil rights progress.3 
This Article suggests such criticism is misplaced. Instead, it links 
the Croson Court's rejection of societal rationales for affirmative action 
to a question the Court did not address, namely: Who should be the 
beneficiaries?4 The argument that follows will suggest that the reasons 
Croson never asked this "Who Question" go a long way to explaining 
the Court's aversion to societal remedies. Appreciating these 
1 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (holding affirmative action subject to strict scrutiny 
and rejecting past societal discrimination as insuffiCiently compelling basis to justify 
race-conscious remedies under that standard). Technically, Croson's holding applied 
only to state and local governments. It took six more years for the other shoe to drop 
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.s. 200, 227 (1995), which held the federal 
government to the same strict scrutiny standard enunciated in Croson. 
2 See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Justice O'Connor's Blind 
Rationalization of Affirmative Action JUrisprudence - Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 31 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 223, 235-38 (1996); Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering 
Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH.]' RACE & L. 51, 70 (1996). 
3 Simmons, supra note 2, at 53-55. The term "color-blindness" comes from 
Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.s. 537, 559 (1896), which 
proclaimed that "Our Constitution is color-blind." It describes a view of equal 
protection inimical to formal distinctions based on race. Cj. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 
(Scalia, j., concurring.) ("In the eyes of government, we are just one race here ... 
American"). 
• This Article focuses on race-based affirmative action. In addressing the 
question of who should benefit from affirmative action, we can identify two distinct 
substantive inquiries: (1) the selection question: which racial or ethnic groups are 
eligible; and (2) the definition question: how do we define the boundaries of a group? 
This Article refers to both inquiries collectively as the "Who Question." The Article 
does not address the related procedural question of how the substantive criteria we 
select are to be applied in practice. See generally Christopher A. Ford, Administering 
Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 
(1994) (considering procedural issues associated with "classificatory due process"). 
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connections has substantive implications for our analysis of 
affirmative action. 
Despite the oceans of ink spilled in pages of American law reviews 
on affirmative action, the Who Question has been conspicuous by its 
absence: only a handful of articles have devoted more than cursory 
attention to the question of who benefits.5 As Professor Cass Sunstein 
has observed, arguments over affirmative action often seem almost 
hopelessly abstract, akin to a stylized "form of Kabuki theater [in 
which] no one learns anything."6 Asking the Who Question serves as 
a valuable corrective. 
Asking who benefits keeps the affirmative action debate grounded in 
facts, rather than abstractions.7 The sheer diversity and heterogeneity 
of racial and ethnic groups who benefit from affirmative action belie 
the simplistic black and white, majority versus minority framework to 
which discussions of race frequently reduce. Moreover, the uneven 
distribution of such benefits undermines assumptions that affirmative 
action is helping the groups that need it most. In particular, current 
practices appear to systematically shortchange the one group whose 
claim to affirmative action is almost universally accepted - African 
Americans.8 
Asking the Who Question thus forces us to confront questions of 
comparative entitlement. Doing so requires clarity as to our 
underlying purpose. After all, who we include in affirmative action 
depends on why we are doing it. 9 Confronting choices between 
potential beneficiaries could help us penetrate the fuzzy rhetoric 
surrounding affirmative action rationales and perhaps target benefits 
5 For two exceptions, see Paul Brest &: Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for 
Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995) (arguments for including different raciaVethnic 
groups under various possible rationales for affirmative action); George La Noue &: 
John Sullivan, Deconstructing the Affirmative Action Categories, 41 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 913 (1998) (questioning arbitrary basis by which current categories of 
affirmative action beneficiaries are constituted). 
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 1311, 1314 (1999). 
7 Focusing on actual outcomes is consistent with the empirical trend in 
affirmative action scholarship that Sunstein and others have championed. Richard H. 
Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 367, 369-70 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1314-15. 
B Nor are blacks the only group to be shortchanged under current practices: 
Native Americans, Southeast Asians, and Pacific Islanders may have their own cause 
for complaint. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
9 There is unlikely to be a single answer to these questions. See Brest &: Oshige, 
supra note 5, at 898-99 (analyzing Who Question in higher education context under 
three possible affirmative action rationales). 
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more rationally. to At the same time, this Article will argue that too 
much clarity could prove counterproductive. Far from an accidental 
oversight, avoidance of the Who Question may reflect the genuine 
costs in undertaking such a project. I I 
Exploring the practical and prudential limitations on our ability to 
answer the Who Question serves to illuminate a much larger debate 
over the nature of equality itself. Ever since Professor Owen Fiss's 
1976 article, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, equality scholars 
have argued over which of two competing models should be used to 
interpret the Equal Protection Clause: antidiscrimination or 
antisubordination. 12 Commentators favoring the latter view have 
criticized existing doctrine for emphasizing an antidiscrimination 
approach that reduces equality to a mere "procedural" requirement of 
facial neutrality in matters of race.13 In advocating an alternative 
antisubordination reading, they seek a more robust "substantive" 
approach focused on equalizing outcomes rather than process. 14 
Viewed through the lens of the Who Question, however, neither 
theory offers a satisfactory method of selecting affirmative action 
beneficiaries. As we will see, an antisubordination approach founders 
on the ambiguous, amorphous nature of group identities and social 
hierarchies whose shifting demographic footprint makes the 
identification of subordinated groups problematic. 15 The Court's 
current approach, rooted in antidiscrimination theory, avoids such 
societal complexities by focusing on remedying underrepresentation 
in particularized contexts. However, this methodology of "counting 
10 See Sean Pager, Comparisons in Color Consciousness: Targeting Affirmative Action 
in India, France and the US, in MULTICULTURALISMS: MEANINGS AND PERSPECTIVES OF 
MULTICULTURALISM IN A GLOBAL WORLD (Barbara Pozzo ed., 2006). 
11 See infra notes 234-57 and accompanying text. 
12 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976); see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L REV. 1470, 1473 n.l0 
(2004) (summarizing extensive literature). Compare Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense 
of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L REV. 1 (1976) (defending 
antidiscrimination reading of Equal Protection Clause), with Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 NYU. L REV. 1003 
(1986) (advocating antisubordination approach). 
13 Simmons, supra note 2, at 81. 
14 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 105 (Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
Antisubordination theorists also challenge current doctrine's focus on individual 
equality at the expense of groups. See id.; Siegel, supra note 12, at 1473. 
15 See infra notes 214-33 and accompanying text. 
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heads" remains incomplete. It tells us how to count, but not which 
heads to count. 16 Appreciating the shortcomings of either approach 
on its own paves the way for an integrated understanding of equal 
protection that combines both perspectives. 
Affirmative action has long represented a key flashpoint in the larger 
debate ove!" equality. By rejecting the remedying of societal 
discrimination as a constitutionally compelling rationale for 
affirmative action, critics see the Supreme Court as marginalizing 
affirmative action by consigning it to narrowly circumscribed contexts, 
grudgingly tolerated as an "exceptional" remedy.17 Moreover, the 
Court's failure to adequately justify its rejection of societal remedies 
has led many to question the Court's motives; they attribute its 
neutering of affirmative action to an ideological enthrallment with 
color-blindness, which, for some, is merely the hegemonic conspiracy 
of white privilege inscribed in legal doctrine. 18 
This Article offers a more prosaic account of the Court's motives. It 
argues that the Supreme Court's aversion to societal remedies is better 
explained by examining the difficulties posed by the Who Question. 
Such difficulties make the explicit targeting of racial hierarchies 
contemplated under an antisubordination model both impractical and 
inadvisable. Reinterpreting Croson in this fashion has important 
implications: understanding the Court's objection to societal remedies 
to be founded on pragmatic concerns rather than underlying principle 
opens the door to the incorporation of antisubordination values into 
existing equal protection doctrine. Such an integrated approach is 
appealing because the Court's current answer to the Who Question 
contains a crucial omission: it has constitutionalized the selection of 
beneficiary groups without defining what counts as a "group." This 
lacuna has left lower courts to adjudicate racial identities under ad hoc 
and wildly inconsistent methods. 19 
Bringing a societal context to the Court's "particularized" remedies 
will enrich our understanding of equal protection and result in more 
nuanced doctrine. Its benefits include: (1) a firmer normative 
foundation for group remedies; (2) more carefully targeted affirmative 
16 See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. 
17 Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 
289. 
18 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
62 (1991); Harris, supra note 14, at 289. 
19 See infra notes 72-88, 134-40 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 295 2007-2008
2007] Antisubordination of Whom? 295 
action; and (3) a rebalancing of decisional authority between the 
judiciary and the political branches in defining racial boundaries. 20 
To advance these arguments, this Article employs a comparative 
international perspective. In doing so, the Article builds on a growing 
receptiveness of American constitutional law to comparative 
scholarship.21 As Professor Clark Cunningham has observed, the 
sterile nature of domestic debate on affirmative action has inspired 
scholars to look elsewhere for fresh ideas. 22 India, in particular, has 
attracted the attention of leading constitutional law scholars,23 
Supreme Courtjustices,24 and social scientists. 25 
In contrast to the relative indifference toward such issues in the 
United States, the Who Question has long been a central 
preoccupation of Indian affirmative action law. The selection and 
identification of beneficiaries has been extensively studied, debated, 
and litigated. As a result, India has developed a rather sophisticated 
methodology that relies on a formalized administrative process to 
determine eligibility empirically by assessing societal disadvantage 
based on socioeconomic data. 26 
By reconceptualizing affirmative action as a project dedicated to 
eradicating societal hierarchies, India illustrates "the road not taken in 
the United States," offering a working model of an antisubordination 
approach to equality.27 The Indian experience thus provides an 
20 Moreover, this integrated understanding of equality has important implications 
beyond the affirmative action context. See infra notes 288-90 and accompanying text. 
21 This trend toward comparative constitutionalism has not been without 
controversy. See Clark Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The 
American Debate Over Affirmative Action Is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from 
Abroad, 36 CONN. L. REV. 665, 665-67 (2004). 
22 Id. at 668. 
23 Eg., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1313; Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions 
Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. 
L. REV 649, 655-56 (2004). 
24 Eg. Cunningham, supra note 21, at 667 n.13 (noting Justices O'Connor and 
Breyer participated in scholarly exchange on affirmative action with justices of 
Supreme Court of India shortly before Grutter opinion was handed down); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights 
Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 273-77 (1999). 
25 Eg., LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING 
THE DISADVANTAGED (2003); SUN ITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (1997); Clark 
D. Cunningham et ai., Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design 
Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835, 873-78 (2002). 
26 See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text. 
27 Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste . .. ? 
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instructive case study. Indeed, such comparative insights prompted a 
group of American scholars to file a recent amicus brief before the U.5. 
Supreme Court, highlighting India's societal approach to the Who 
Question. 28 The brief expliCitly proposed that the United States adopt 
India's methodology.29 
This Article casts doubt on the amicus scholars' proposal. In this 
critique, the Indian example functions not as a model to emulate but 
rather as a demonstration of why an antisubordination approach 
would prove unworkable in the United States context. Any attempt to 
select affirmative action beneficiaries on this basis would be 
confounded by the demographic complexities posed by immigration 
and social mobility. Moreover, the racially polarizing effects of such 
efforts would exact a prohibitive social COSt. 3D 
The comparative perspective thus helps to account for the current 
U.5. approach to - or avoidance of - the Who Question. Our 
laissez-faire attitude to questions of racial entitlement, in turn, 
reinforces the Supreme Court's preference for an antidiscrimination 
reading of equality. However, an antidiscrimination approach has its 
own shortcomings. To overcome this impasse, this Article proposes 
an integrated solution in which the two readings of equality would go 
hand in hand, with antisubordination values serving to give normative 
content to antidiscrimination doctrine. The Article concludes with 
some practical illustrations of the potential for this integrated 
understanding to resolve ambigUities in current doctrine. It also 
shows how a more modest adoption of Indian methodology could 
improve on our current method of selecting affirmative action 
beneficiaries.31 
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I.A begins by exploring 
the connection between the Supreme Court's silence on the Who 
Question and its rejection of societal remedies. Part I.B shows how 
the Court's silence leaves in place a popular consensus approach to 
racial categories by default. This section challenges such popular 
consensus definitions on several levels, namely: (1) the indeterminate 
Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH L. REV. 1296, 1302-05 (1999). 
28 Brief for Social Science and Comparative Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.s. 103 (2001) 
(No. 00-730). 
29 ld. Three of these scholars later expanded the insights of their brief in a law 
review article calling for a more general reform of affirmative action. See Cunningham 
et aI., supra note 25, at 882. 
30 See infra notes 234-51 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 291-97, 305-10 and accompanying text. 
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boundaries of the standard racial categories, (2) the extreme 
heterogeneity of the groups contained within them, and (3) the 
arbitrary basis on which such groups were constituted. Indeterminacy 
and heterogeneity are demonstrated empirically, the former through 
survey evidence showing inconsistencies in the definitions actually 
used in affirmative action, and the latter through socioeconomic data 
drawn from the U.S. Census. Arbitrariness is traced both historically, 
by showing how our current categories emerged through a largely ad 
hoc process driven by bureaucratic and political expediency, and 
doctrinally, in the wildly inconsistent ruling of courts facing 
classificatory challenges. Part I.C confronts the inability of 
antidiscrimination theory to resolve such ambiguity and arbitrariness. 
Such failures call into question the Supreme Court's laissez-faire 
approach to the Who Question. Investigating the claims of "inherent 
unmeasurability" that underlie this approach entails exploring the 
feaSibility of quantifying racial disadvantage. 
Part II.A then introduces India's model in which empirical 
assessments of societal disadvantage are used to determine affirmative 
action eligibility. Part II.B illustrates how the model might be applied 
in practice to the u.s. context, again using Census data disaggregated 
into racial subgroups. Doing so raises both demographic and 
methodological challenges. In particular, Part II.C highlights the 
uncertain connection between immigration and ethnic disadvantage. 
Part II.D then explores the prudential risks in embraCing Indian 
methodology: the Who Question can be divisive, heightening race 
consciousness in ways that have unintended repercussions. 
Ultimately, Part II concludes that the Supreme Court's avoidance of 
the Who Question may be justified on political grounds. Accordingly, 
the Court's aversion to societal remedies can be explained in terms of 
second order consequentialist concerns rather than any a priori 
principle. 
Understanding the Court's objections to antisubordination as 
grounded in pragmatism rather than principle opens the door to a 
reintegration of antisubordination values in equal protection doctrine. 
Part IILA explores the potential for an antisubordination perspective 
to resolve ambiguities in affirmative action case law by moving away 
from an intent-based notion of discrimination. It also calls for 
consideration of systemic disadvantage as a threshold test to tailor the 
categories we count with. Part IILB proposes some further 
applications of Indian methodology with regard to the definitional 
issues of race, arguing for a more differentiated and contextualized 
analysiS of ethnic subgroups. Part III.C then addresses a procedural 
issue, namely: who decides the Who Question? Here, India's 
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administrative process model offers a useful midpoint between two 
competing impulses in U.S. law: avoidance and constitutionalization. 
The fingerprints of race are undeniable. How we choose to 
acknowledge them is up to us. 
I. A TALE OF TwO EQUALITIES 
A. What the Supreme Court Hasn't Told Us 
The absence of the Who Question from affirmative action discourse 
in the United States can be explained historically in part. Like the 
Civil Rights Movement from which it sprang, affirmative action 
initially focused on redress for the historical injustices of slavery and 
segregation - a legacy of oppression centering on the experience of 
African Americans. 32 Not only did African Americans present the 
most compelling claim to racial justice,33 for all intents and purposes, 
they were the only racial minority of national significance.34 In the 
atmosphere of crisis precipitated by the 1960s race riots, early efforts 
to ensure equal opportunity hardened into overt racial preferences, 
with little unifying vision beyond the perceived need for action. 35 
Because such efforts focused so clearly on one group - African 
Americans - the Who Question was largely overlooked.36 
32 HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 143-44, 173 (2002). Former 
President Lyndon Johnson famously justified affirmative action by evoking the 
imagery of slavery. "You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring up to the starting line of a race and then say, 'You are 
free to compete with all the others.'" Id. at 77. 
33 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, 
J., concurring & dissenting). "The experience of Negroes in America has been 
different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely 
the history of slavery alone but also that of a whole people marked as inferior by the 
law." Id. 
34 David Lauter, Minorities Adding up to a Majority, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), 
Apr. 12, 1995, at El. Other groups were mostly limited to a regional presence: 
Chinese and Japanese Americans on the West Coast, Mexican Americans in the 
Southwest, and Puerto Ricans in the Northeast. GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 104. 
35 Id. at 137-38; JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 89-110 
(1996). 
36 Lauter, supra note 34; see Cunningham et al., supra note 25, at 864. The 1967 
Kerner Commission investigating the race riots concluded that "special 
encouragement" was needed to guide blacks into the economic mainstream. No other 
groups were discussed. George La Noue & John Sullivan, Presumptions for 
Preferences: The Small Business Administration's Decisions on Groups Entitled to 
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Over time, the original focus on remedying historical injustice 
expanded to embrace other objectives and include other groupS.37 Yet, 
while courts have said a lot about why we have affirmative action (Le., 
which rationales are constitutionally compelling) and how we should 
do it (preferably not via quotas), they have said very little about who 
gets included. 
Such judicial avoidance of the Who Question is no accident. The 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to choose between competing 
groups because it regards such questions as judicially unmanageable.38 
As Justice Powell explained in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, almost every ethnic group has suffered at least some 
discrimination at some point. The United States, he argued in Bakke, 
"ha[s) become a Nation of minorities," in which even the so-called 
'''majority' is composed of various minority groups, most of whom can 
lay claim to a history of prior discrimination. "39 He saw no principled 
basis to prioritize their competing claims to remedial justice. "The 
kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary ... simply 
does not lie within the judicial competence. "40 In Croson, Justice 
O'Connor similarly bemoaned the impossibility of selecting between 
"inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."41 
This refusal to play favorites animates the Court's antidiscrimination 
approach to equality. By reading the Equal Protection Clause to 
Affirmative Action, 6 ]. POL'y HIST. 439, 440-43 (1994). Similarly, the Labor 
Department held hearings in 1969 to document discrimination against black workers 
to justify its "Philadelphia Plan" for raCially preferential hiring. No record was made 
of discrimination against any other minority groups at the hearings. GRAHAM, supra 
note 32, at 139. 
37 See GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 195; Paul Frymer &: John D. Skrentny, The Rise of 
Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 677, 677-81 (2004). 
38 Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of 
Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1995) (describing Who 
Question as Rehnquist Court's worst nightmare). 
39 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292, 295 (1978). 
40 Id. at 297; see also De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.s. 312, 333-34 (1974) 
(Douglas,]., dissenting) (noting theoretical difficulties in evaluating competing claims 
of minority groups). 
41 Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469, 506 (1989). Justices Powell and 
O'Connor's concerns focus on the institutional inadequacy of the courts to engage in 
societal fact finding. See Cunningham et aI., supra note 25, at 857-59 (arguing Court 
was only concerned with its own institutional limitations). However, O'Connor 
makes clear that strict scrutiny does not permit the judiciary to defer to anyone else 
on these issues either, therefore effectively taking societal rationales off the table. See 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94,510-11. 
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require equal treatment between individuals rather than groups, the 
Court deflects the issue of systemic inequalities and renders racial 
hierarchies invisible. This reading of equality regards racial 
classifications as inherently "suspect," making affirmative action 
presumptively invalid regardless who the beneficiaries are. Race itself 
is reduced to an abstraction, an irrelevant and illegitimate criterion 
that only the most compelling rationale and narrowly tailored means 
can legitimize. 
The result has been to significantly restrict the scope of affirmative 
action by foreclOSing societal rationales for affirmative action. 
Applying its strict scrutiny standard, the Court has rejected societal 
discrimination as too "amorphous" to support racial preferences.42 
Instead, the Court has conditioned the use of racial preferences on 
more narrowly defined aims limited to specific contexts: either 
remedying identified discrimination within a particularized setting or 
enhancing the diversity of viewpoints represented in higher 
education.43 
Focusing on such particularized contexts eliminates any need to 
address the societal significance of race. Instead, the U.s. answer to 
the Who Question, to the extent it has one, focuses on numbers: 
affirmative action is cognized in terms of remedying the 
"underrepresentation" of racial and ethnic minorities. Therefore, 
either explicitly or implicitly, the choice of beneficiaries is determined 
essentially by counting heads. 
Under the Croson decision, such counting became a constitutional 
mandate. Croson holds that cities could justify racial preferences by 
demonstrating a Significant disparity between the availability of 
qualified minority-owned firms and the share of city contracts 
awarded to such firms.44 The Court emphasizes that the disparities 
must be shown to exist within a specific sector in the local market.45 
Such disparities created an inference of unlawful discrimination that 
would legitimate a remedy for underrepresented groups. What the 
Court does not tell us, however, is underrepresentation of whom? 
The Court seemed to suggest that disparities be measured on a group-
42 Croson, 488 U.s. at 505, 510 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.s. 
267,276 (1986)). 
43 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 306,339-43 (2003). 
44 See Croson, 488 U.s. at 501-03, 509. Croson makes clear that such disparities 
can only legitimize the use of racial preferences in extreme cases. 
45 rd. at 504 (rejecting Richmond's efforts to rely on findings of discrimination in 
contracting nationwide). 
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specific basis, yet it left open the definitional question of which heads 
get counted in which column or even what the categories should be. 
Reconceiving racism as discrete acts of prejudice in a limited 
context elides the enduring salience of societal discrimination. 46 
Moreover, Croson's prescribed means to identify such particularized 
injuries distances the Court even further from social context: In 
relying on statistical disparities to justify racial preferences, the Court 
supplants a messy inquiry into the dynamics of group prejudice with 
the seemingly objective comfort of statistical analysis. The Court no 
longer has to choose between groups because the numbers will do the 
job for it. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell introduced a second rationale for 
affirmative action: promoting educational diversity by giving 
preference to underrepresented viewpoints. 47 Rather than awarding a 
predetermined preference based on race, universities were instructed 
to weigh the total diversity value of each applicant in a holistic 
assessment in which race would be considered amongst other 
characteristics.4s Focusing on individual applicants again moves away 
from the broader societal relevance of race. Moreover, by deferring to 
univerSItIeS on First Amendment grounds to make such 
determinations, the Court remains agnostic as to who would qualify 
under such a regime.49 
In both cases, the Court's solution relies on counting. Whether 
measured in contracts or viewpoints, group representation has thus 
become our default answer to the Who Question.50 The process by 
which such counting occurs depends on the context. Croson 
establishes an intricate statistical methodology to calculate disparities 
in contracting. Bakke and its progeny stipulate a flexible, 
46 Cj. Gotanda, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
47 Justice Powell's diversity rationale, first enunciated in Bakke, received the 
imprimatur of the full Court in Grutter, 539 U.s. at 325. 
48 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,318 (1978). 
49 See id. at 312-13; Richard Pildes &: Richard Niemi, Expressive Hanns, "Bizarre 
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 498 (1993). 
50 EEOC reporting requirements likewise force employers to pay attention to 
racial balance, many of whom voluntarily undertake affirmative action to increase 
minOrity representation. Deborah Malamud, Affinnative Action and Ethnic Niches, in 
COLOR LiNES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR 
AMERICA 321 Qohn David Skrentny ed., 2001) (explaining how employers have 
incentive to maintain racial parity to preempt discrimination claims). 
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individualized evaluation in which race is weighed as only one "plus 
factor" among many.51 Yet, the numbers game is ubiquitous. 
But who are we counting? Which minority groups do we look at?52 
How do we define them? Croson doesn't tell us. It instructs us to 
choose beneficiaries through statistical analyses, but says almost 
nothing about whose statistics to gather. Similarly, Bakke accepts race 
as a proxy for viewpoint yet leaves open how underrepresented 
"racial" views are to be identified. Bakke and Croson thus answer only 
half the Who Question. They allow us to choose affirmative action 
beneficiaries through numerical formulae, while ignoring the 
definitional question of what race actually is. 53 
B. What's Wrong with the Status Quo? 
The Court's hands-off approach to the Who Question has some 
perverse consequences. The original beneficiaries of affirmative 
action, African Americans, now constitute a minority among 
minorItles, while affirmative action benefits instead go 
disproportionately54 to newer immigrant groups who lack a 
51 Justice Powell makes a point of distinguishing Harvard's flexible, individualized 
assessments of diversity (good) versus UC Davis's overly rigid, numerical quotas 
(bad). Grutter, 539 U.s. at 335 (reiterating distinction). 
52 America is full of ethnic and national origin groups that could potentially face 
discrimination. The U.s. Census Bureau counts at least 630 established ethnic groups. 
Students in New York City School District 23 alone converse in some 83 different 
languages. See La Noue &: Sullivan, supra note 36, at 439. It would be impractical to 
count them all, but how do we choose between them, or even decide who goes in 
which box? 
53 Despite a vast body of case law on discrimination, there is surprisingly little law 
defining the core concepts of "race" or "ethnicity." This ambiguity proved 
controversial when the Small Business Administration ("SBA") excluded Hasidic Jews 
from federal affirmative action on the ground that the Hasids were a religious group 
and not an ethnicity. See id. at 449. 
54 In 1993, black-owned construction companies received less than a fifth of 
federal highway set-asides, and in 1996 garnered only a third of the SBA minority 
business funding - less than the share of their proportional representation among 
U.s. minorities would justify and roughly half their share from a decade earlier. Asian 
Americans claimed almost as much SBA money as African Americans despite having 
half the population. GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 164; see also id. at 192, 197 (describing 
how many employers have added "diversity" to their workforce by hiring Hispanic or 
Asian immigrants at the expense of African Americans); George R. La Noue, The 
Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 1,41 (1997) 
(noting slower growth rate of black-owned businesses compared to other minorities 
will mean continued decline in African American share of Minority Business 
Entrepreneur ("MBE") benefits); Malamud, supra note 50, at 318 (describing 
predominant share of minority scholarships going to nonblacks). 
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comparable history of discrimination in the United States.55 Indeed, 
even within the category of "African American," the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action are increasingly black immigrants from Africa and 
the Caribbean rather than the descendants of American slaves 
originally contemplated. 56 
Croson's insistence on counting in particularized contexts also 
penalizes groups such as Native Americans whose numbers are often 
too small to generate statistically meaningful evidence. Conversely, 
counting with broad categories leads to other problems. For example, 
because Asians as a whole are no longer underrepresented in higher 
education, Asian subgroups such as Laotians and Samoans who are 
underrepresented are denied access to affirmative action. 
By default, most affirmative action plans continue to claSSify 
beneficiaries within one of four broad racial groupings devised by 
federal statisticians: black, Asian, Hispanic, and Native Americans. 
This "ethno-racial quadrangle" has emerged as our quasi-official 
definition of what it means to be a "minority" in the United States. 
Yet, as a blueprint for affirmative action, the value of the quadrangle is 
questionable for at least three reasons: (1) its boundaries are 
indeterminate; (2) the internal heterogeneity of these groupings is too 
extreme for them to serve as meaningful categories; and (3) its 
categories were arbitrarily constituted and unfairly advantage certain 
groups over others. We will explore each of these objections in turn. 
1. Indeterminancy 
Most people take the standard minority categories for granted. So 
deeply are they woven into our national consciousness that they seem 
innate, almost like the air we breathe.57 Examined more closely, 
however, the categories of the quadrangle appear far more anomalous 
and arbitrary. 
For one thing, there is widespread disagreement as to their 
boundaries. For example, the Hispanic classification varies 
considerably across jurisdictions. Even within the same region, 
different entities may recognize' different groups as Hispanic.58 
55 La Noue &: Sullivan, supra note 36, at 460. 
56 Jennifer Lee, The Racial and Ethnic Meaning Behind Black, in COLOR LINES, supra 
note 50, at 184; Sara Rimer &: Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But 
Which Ones?, N.Y. TIMEs,June 24,2004, at AI. 
57 DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING "RACE" AND "ETHNICITY" IN AMERICA 83-85 (2003) 
(charting evolution of categories). 
58 See infra Table 1 (contrasting Hispanic definitions used in five Bay Area 
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According to the U.S. Census, "Hispanic" does not even count as a 
race. Instead, it is treated as an "ethnic category" that cuts across 
racial identities and is tracked independently. 
Uncertainty as to who counts as Hispanic naturally leads to 
questions over eligibility for affirmative action. The definitional 
boundaries of "Hispanic-ness" have been repeatedly contested. The 
inclusion of Spanish and Portuguese Americans in affirmative action 
remedies has proven particularly contentious. San Francisco's Civil 
Service Commission fielded a heated debate on the issue,59 and 
litigation in New York State reached the Second Circuit. 60 
Table 1. Who Is Hispanic? 
Name of Jurisdiction 
Atlanta 
Baltimore 
Boston 
Miami 
New York 
Oakland* 
Richmond* 
San Francisco* 
San Jose* 
Small Business 
Administration 
U.s. Census** 
Stanford University 
Univ. of Texas+ 
* Pre-1996 
+ Pre-1995 
Spaniards Portuguese Other Latin American 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
Only Mexican American and 
No Puerto Rican 
No Onlr Mexican American 
** U.s. Census treats Hispanic classification as an 
ethnic identity independent of its racial categories 
jurisdictions). The data presented are drawn primarily from a survey of municipal 
MBE programs conducted in 2004 by, and on file with, the author. 
59 See Alex Saragoza et al., History and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the 
Hispanic Classification, 5 LA RAZA L.J. 1,4-10 (1992). 
60 Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 201-03 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
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Nor are Hispanics the only beneficiary group to inspire such 
definitional debates. The boundaries of the "Asian Pacific" 
classification are equally variable and contested.61 Ohio courts fielded 
a flurry of litigation when the state decided that contractors from India 
and Lebanon no longer qualified for affirmative action set-asidesY 
Oregon administrators wrestled with a similar ambiguity when a 
Kazakh contractor claimed eligibility.63 
Even African American has become a contested category. 
Commentators have questioned whether black immigrants should 
qualify for affirmative action in light of recent studies showing that 
forty percent of African American students admitted at Harvard and 
other elite universities were immigrants or children of immigrants.64 
Studies have also shown that employers in New York City are much 
more willing to hire Jamaicans and Africans than non-immigrant 
blacks.65 
"African-ness" is itself contested. Affirmative action programs 
typically define African Americans in circular fashion as descended 
from "black racial groups. "66 Yet, racial distinctions in Africa are not 
always clear-cut. While philanthropist Teresa Heinz Kerry faced 
ridicule for implying that her (Caucasian) Afrikaner heritage made her 
"African American,"67 minority contracting programs have had a much 
61 Formal definitions of the "Asian" category vary widely. Some exclude 
subcontinental Asians or Filipinos; others leave out Pacific Islanders and/or Native 
Hawaiians. Some include Afghanis; the city of Charlotte also included Persians. See 
George La Noue, Standards for the Second Generation of Croson-Inspired Studies, 26 
URB. LAw. 485, 491 (1994); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of What?, 55 
REPRESENTATIONS 129, 130 (1996). 
62 The case of Lebanese American contractor Nadim Ritchey went all the way to 
the Ohio Supreme Court (he lost). Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871, 927 
(Ohio 1999). 
63 Telephone Interview with Jill Miller, Certification Specialist, Oregon Office of 
Minority, Women &: Emerging Small Bus., in Portland, Or. (May 27,2004). 
64 Rimer &: Arenson, supra note 56. The University of Texas explicitly excluded 
black immigrants from affirmative action. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 936 n.4 
(5th Cir. 1996) (describing Texas's admissions preferences as applying only to 
"American blacks," but not "a black citizen of Nigeria"). At least one federal court of 
appeals has questioned giving "African American a hemispheric meaning." 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 158 n.ll (4th Cir. 1994) (questioning award of 
racial scholarship to student from Jamaica). 
65 See Lee, supra note 56, at 184. 
66 E.g., 13 C.F.R. §.124.103 (2007); 49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2007). 
67 Maureen Oowd, Out of Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at 0-13. 
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harder time deciding whether Sudanese and Ethiopians qualify as 
"black. ,,68 
Meanwhile, other ethnic groups currently classified as white have 
sought "minority" status in part to gain inclusion in affirmative action. 
While Middle Eastern Americans lobbied unsuccessfully for Census 
recognition in 2000, they did win eligibility for affirmative action in 
San Francisco. French Acadians were eligible in Louisiana. The City 
University of New York at one point recognized Italian Americans. 69 
Congress championed rural Appalachian whites as equally deserving. 70 
And while Hasidic Jews failed to win recognition from the Small 
Business Administration ("SBA"), they are included in other federal 
affirmative action contexts. 71 
As such contests over categorical boundaries find their way into the 
courts, the result has been alarmingly inconsistent rulings. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that accepting Iberian 
Americans as Hispanic for purposes of affirmative action violated the 
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.72 The category definition 
was deemed overinclusive. Judges in the Eleventh Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion on the same question. 73 Meanwhile, the Fifth 
Circuit suggested that counting only Mexican Americans could be 
underinclusive. 74 
If you read these opinions, there seems little driving them besides 
the judges' underlying intuitions. Judge Richard Posner stated flatly 
that Iberians have not been victims of discrimination and challenged 
the defendant to produce evidence to the contrary.75 The Eleventh 
68 Interview with Hayden Lee, Lee Associates, in S.F., Cal. Gan. 28, 1998); cj. The 
World Notices Darfur, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 39 (describing racial 
ambiguities in Darfur). 
69 YANOW, supra note 57, at 67. 
70 See La Noue &: Sullivan, supra note 36, at 443 (describing legislative history to 
congressional authorization of federal MBE program). 
71 Compare La Noue &: Sullivan, supra note 36, at 449 (describing exclusion of 
Hasids from SBA definition of presumptively socially disadvantaged groups), with 
CONGo RESEARCH SERV., COMPILATION AND OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAws AND 
REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS (1995) (citing 48 c.F.R. § 
2426.101 (1994)) (minority definition for public housing includes Hasidic Jews). 
Hasidic Jews were also eligible for other SBA programs at some point. La Noue &: 
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 461. 
72 Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. V. Cook County, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
73 See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1560 (llth Cir. 1994). 
74 Hopwood V. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 n.37 (5th Cir. 1996). 
75 Builders Ass'n, 256 F.3d at 64 7. 
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Circuit reversed the burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to prove 
that Iberians did not qualify as a protected group.76 Meanwhile, the 
Fifth Circuit simply assumed the underinclusiveness of Mexican 
Americans is self-explanatory.77 
The wildly different stratagems courts have employed to cope with 
such disputes testifies to the inability of current doctrine to resolve 
them. Some courts avoid grappling with definitional issues directly.78 
Some falsely assume that disparity testing can itself validate the initial 
choice of categories. 79 Others struggle to locate definitional disputes 
within equal protection doctrine. Such classificatory challenges could 
be cognized in two different ways: either (1) as a facial attack on the 
definition qua racial classification, or (2) as a narrow tailoring 
challenge to the remedy that follows from it. Courts have followed 
both approaches, sometimes even in the same opinion.8o They also 
differ as to the level of scrutiny they apply.8l Still others treat 
76 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1164 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
77 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 n.37. 
78 Courts have invoked obstacles of standing to deflect definitional challenges, cJ. 
Peightal, 940 F.2d at 1409 n.39 (questioning plaintifPs standing as white male to 
object to Hispanic definition); limited their assessment to the facts "as applied," cJ. id. 
at 1545; Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., No. 5:04-CV-635 
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004)(mem.) ai/d, 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006); or demanded 
evidence of bad intent, cJ. Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 
438 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2006). Others simply ignore the issue entirely. Rothe 
Dev. Corp. v. U.s. Dep't of DeL, 324 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2004). 
79 CJ. Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871,917-23 (Ohio 1999). Such 
courts argue that disparity testing "validates" the categories being tested because it 
identifies discrimination against the population thus encompassed. Yet, such 
reasoning is circular. Because disparity testing merely infers "discrimination" 
statistically, the validity of such findings hinges on the assumptions underlying its 
inputs. For example, Hispanics might be found to be underrepresented whether or 
not Iberians are included in the relevant data set. While Hispanic underrepresentation 
might support a general inference of anti-Hispanic bias, it tells us nothing about 
whether Iberians experience the same discrimination. Croson's methodology instead 
remains a black box to which the old saying applies: Garbage in, garbage out. 
80 Compare Jana-Rock, No. 5:04-CV-635 (applying facial classification approach), 
with Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 205 (pursuing both approaches), and Peightal, 26 F.3d at 
1557-61 (applying narrow tailoring analysis). 
81 Compare Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 207, 212 (declining to apply either strict 
scrutiny directly or require narrow tailoring), with Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. 
Cook County, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 200l) (requiring narrow tailOring), and 
Ritchey, 707 N.E. 2d at 878 (quoting decision of trial court) (calling for strict scrutiny 
to be applied). 
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definitional uncertainties as a statutory interpretation issue, "more a 
question of nomenclature than of narrow tailoring. ,,82 
Courts have also differed widely as to the evidentiary criteria they 
examine. In trying to define what it means, for example, to be 
"Hispanic" for purposes of affirmative action, some courts have 
consulted dictionaries and turned to legislative history.83 Some assume 
"Hispanic-ness" is a question of ancestry; others stress language, 
culture,84 history,85 community practice,86 or even physical 
appearance.87 For some courts, defining the boundaries of "Hispanic" 
is like asking where blue ends and green begins; they dismiss the 
category as meaningless.88 
2. Heterogeneity 
The problem goes beyond mere uncertainty as to the boundary lines 
between racial categories. The very logiC of using such categories is 
arguably undermined by the heterogeneous nature of the groups 
contained within them. Across a wide array of socioeconomic 
indicators, the differences within the main racial groups appear as 
great as those between them. Such internal variance is particularly 
striking within the Asian and Hispanic categories.89 Across the board, 
the "top performers" in these groups score well above the u.s. average, 
while those at the bottom measure well below the U.s. average. 
For example, Asian Indian, Chinese, and Japanese Americans earn 
bachelors degrees at almost double the u.s. average, and their success 
at the graduate level is even more extreme: almost quadruple the u.s. 
average in the case of Indian Americans. Twice as many Asian Indians 
82 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147,1185 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
83 St. Francis ColI. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.s. 604, 610 (l987) (defining race in part 
based on popular understandings at time § 1981 was enacted); Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 
927 (construing "the common, ordinary, and everyday meaning of the term 
'Oriental''') . 
84 Lagrua v. Ward, 519 N.Y.s.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
85 Builders Ass'n, 256 F .3d at 647. 
86 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.s. 475, 479-80 (1954). 
87 Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 
Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1408-09 (11th Cir. 1991) (Brown,].). 
88 Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1069 
n.17 (D. Colo. 2000) (describing Hispanic as inherently indeterminate category for 
which "there is no agreed working definition"); Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1084-
85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (questioning whether Hispanics constitute judicially 
cognizable ethnic group for jury selection purposes). 
89 See infra Table 2 for Asian Census data. For a comparable analysis of Hispanic 
subgroups, see infra notes 206-09 and Table 3. 
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occupy managerial or professional positions as the u.s. norm, with 
Chinese and Japanese also well above average. These groups' homes 
are valued at double the u.s. median. By contrast, Cambodian, 
Laotian, Samoan, and Tongan Americans show statistics that present 
almost the reciprocal image of their East and South Asian 
compatriots.90 Cambodian Americans garner half as many bachelor's 
degrees and a quarter the number of graduate degrees as the U.s. 
average, their representation among the professional class is half the 
u.S. rate, and their poverty rate more than double. Laotians, Samoans, 
and Tongans fare only slightly better. 
Table 2. Socioeconomic Breakdown of Asian Pacific Subgroups 
Education Occupation Propert~ Income 
Population % earning degree Managerial or Median Home % below 
Group Bachelors Graduate Professional Value Poverty Level 
ALL U.S. 15.5% 8.8% 33.6% $119,600 12.4% 
ASIANS 26.7% 17.3% 44.6% $199,300 12.6% 
Asian Indian 29.6% 34.3% 59.9% $210,200 9.8% 
Japanese 28.7% 13.1% 50.6% $238,300 9.7% 
Chinese 24.1% 23.8% 52.2% $232,200 13.5% 
Koreans 29.1% 14.6% 38.7% $209,500 14.8% 
Vietnamese 14.5% 4.8% 26.9% $151,400 16.0% 
Samoan* 7.5% 3.0% 18.6% $153;200 20.2% 
Tongan* 7.3% 1.3% 13.3% $149,100 19.5% 
Laotians 6.3% 1.4% 13.3% $100,500 18.5% 
Cambodian 6.9% 2.2% 17.8% $120,800 29.3% 
BLACKS 9.5% 4.8% 25.2% $80,600 24.9% 
*Not included in Asian totals Source: 2000 u.s. Census 
Such intragroup differences call into question the statistical 
inferences of discrimination on which Croson is premised by 
potentially skewing the data used in disparity analyses. For example, 
consider the variation in business formation rates among Asian 
90 The socioeconomic standing of Southeast Asians and Pacific Islanders thus 
more closely resembles African Americans than the "model minority" stereotype 
associated with the Asian group overall. 
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Americans (a key variable used in disparity analyses): Koreans have 
the highest business formation rate of any ethnic group, while 
Laotians have the lowest. 91 If a disparity study lumps these groups 
together, its conclusions may not tell you much based on numbers 
alone. 
Disparate business formation rates have been specifically cited by 
courts as undermining the results of disparity studies.92 Such internal 
heterogeneity also raises the danger that nondisadvantaged subgroups 
may ride the coattails of their less fortunate group members. The 
problem is not just that a few jobs or contracts may go to a group that 
does not deserve them. Less-disadvantaged groups often end up 
usurping a disproportionate share.93 
The risks cut both ways. Not only can undeserving subgroups 
piggyback on the underrepresented status of a larger group, but 
genUinely disadvantaged subgroups might be unfairly excluded if the 
larger, umbrella group they belong to is too successful. One sees this 
in higher education, where Asians are often overrepresented and no 
longer counted for diversity purposes. Yet, several Asian Pacific 
subgroups remain heavily underrepresented.94 Samoan and Laotian 
students thus suffer from being lumped together with more successful 
East and South Asians. 
Moreover, some arguably disadvantaged minority groups lie outside 
the quadrangle entirely. A recent study of employment discrimination 
in California looked at discrimination against job applicants with 
ethnically identifiable names.95 The study revealed greater bias against 
applicants with identifiably Arab names than those of any other ethnic 
group, which is hardly surprising after 9/11. Yet, most affirmative 
91 See La Noue &: Sullivan, supra note 5, at 913. 
92 Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Houston Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. 
Transit Auth., 993 F. Supp. 545, 554 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (condemning "use of aggregate 
statistics [that fail to] show the variation within the groups"). 
93 "[W]hen all members of minority groups are equally eligible for affirmative 
action, the best-off among them will prevaiL" Malamud, supra note 50, at 321. An 
extreme example of this phenomenon occurred in Washington, D.C., where a pair of 
Portuguese American brothers, duly certified as "Hispanic business owners," managed 
to claim more than 60% of affirmative action contracts. See GRAHAM, supra note 32 at 
154; see also THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 12,33 (2004) (providing further empirical evidence). 
94 Brief, supra note 28. 
95 DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH CTR., NAMES MAKE A DIFFERENCE: THE SCREENING OF 
RESUMES BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2004) (on file with 
author). 
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action programs count Arab Americans as white, which means they 
don't get counted at all. 
3. Arbitrary Composition 
Some argue that such internal differences are inevitable and beside 
the point. Race is not a logical construct but a projection of societal 
perceptions and stereotypes, however irrationa1.96 Courts have 
therefore defended a "popular consensus" approach to the Who 
Question on the ground that race is best understood as "a matter of 
practice or attitude in the community."97 Choosing affirmative action 
categories that reflect such conventions also accords with a long line 
of Supreme Court cases that have defined race according to a "popular 
belief' standard.98 
However, to say that the categories used in affirmative action 
"reflect" a popular consensus may be to get the causality reversed. 
The federal government's establishment of formal categories for race 
has itself helped to manufacture the current consensus on race. One 
of the by-products of the Civil Rights Movement was that federal 
agencies suddenly felt the need to collect detailed racial data across a 
wide range of contexts. Federal statisticians therefore devised new 
standardized categories to record such data. 99 To some extent, the 
categories devised by federal statisticians tracked the "classic color 
codes" of an earlier era. IOO Yet, in other ways, the categories were 
96 See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1561 n.25 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(bemoaning "irrationality of the definitional process underlying social stereotypes"); 
Ian F. Haney Lopez; The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 1,53-
57 (1994). 
97 Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25. 
98 St. Francis Coll.v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.s. 604, 610 (1987) (defining race based 
on popular understanding at time of § 1981's enactment); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE 
By LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 7-8 (1996) (describing naturalization 
cases). 
99 Prior to this time, the boundaries of race had remained ill-defined and were 
often regionally specific. Conceptions of race continued to evolve as ethnic minorities 
such as "Jews" and "Irish," initially stigmatized as racial outsiders, gradually 
assimilated into the white "majority." Thus, as Justice Powell observed in Bakke, 
"[ t] he concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect temporary arrangements 
and political judgments." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265,295 (1978); 
GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 40, 42; see also St. Francis, 481 U.S. at 610 ("Plainly, all 
those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race 
[in the nineteenth century]"). See generally NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME 
WHITE 1-10 (1995). 
100 David A. Hollinger, Group Preferences, Cultural Diversity, and Social Democracy: 
Notes Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 31, 33 (1996). 
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clearly constitutive. The Hispanic category, in particular, crystallized 
a new popular understanding of race. The Mexican Americans of the 
southwest, the northeast's Puerto Ricans, and Florida's Cubans had 
rarely thought of themselves, or been thought of by others, as 
constituting a single group until somebody decided to lump them into 
a single statistical category of "Spanish Americans."101 Moreover, the 
classic color codes expanded to "color in" all sorts of new immigrant 
groups whose racial identities may have been ambiguous upon arrival 
(and occaSionally "recolored" existing groups). In the process, their 
boundaries have stretched almost beyond recognition. The "Asian 
Pacific Islander" category today joins together half the world's 
population. 
Several recent studies have shed light on the genesis of our current 
racial consensus. 102 Three main themes emerge. First, the categories 
we use were largely created by midlevel bureaucrats acting with little 
or no policy gUidance and virtually no public input other than 
selective lobbying by self-serving ethnic interests. 103 Instead, such 
decisions were made in essentially ad hoc fashion, with little thought 
as to their long-term consequences. 104 
Second, once the lists were created, included groups quickly 
assumed the status of "official" minorities. !Os Originally created as 
statistical measures to monitor equal opportunity, the federal 
101 rd. at 879 n.258. In part, such a grouping was inspired by bureaucratic 
convenience. Political considerations also played a role: The Nixon White House 
actively lobbied to include Cubans in the nascent category to curry favor with this 
loyal bloc of Republican voters. La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 915. The 
artificiality of this new grouping was underlined by the initial confusion as to what to 
call it: Spanish Americans, Spanish-Speaking Americans, and Spanish-Surnamed 
Americans all vied for contention (each of which, taken literally, would embrace 
slightly different constituencies). Moreover, Puerto Ricans remained excluded from 
early definitions of this group. Only in 1976 was the category rechristened 
"Hispanic." GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 139 n.16. 
102 See id. at 134-47; La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 440-460; Cunningham 
et al., supra note 25, at 859-73; John D. Skrenty, Inventing Race Development of 
Affirmative Action and Definition of Minorities, 146 PUB. INT. 97, 97-113 (2002). See 
generally La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 36 (describing history and genesis of 
affirmative action). 
103 GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 134, 136; La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 440-
41. 
104 Instrumental constraints also influenced the choices. For example, EEOC 
categories were intended to be used by employers classifying their workforce through 
visual inspection. White ethnic groups, which would be more to difficult to 
distingUish visually, were not included partly for this reason. Cunningham et al., 
supra note 25, at 862-64. 
105 Id. at 859-67. 
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categories were carried over into overtly preferential contexts without 
any second thought as to their suitability. Blindly propagated 
throughout all levels of government, the ethno-racial quadrangle 
became the template of affirmative action eligibility by default. 
Third, while the original categories centered on groups with 
undeniable histories of persecution, they soon embraced newer 
immigrant groups with more tenuous claims to inclusion. Thus, while 
the standard categories have remained largely fixed since the 1960s, 
the groups included within these categories have expanded over time. 
Like a hungry Pacman devouring a global game board, the original 
"Oriental" category composed of Chinese and Japanese Americans 
rapidly engulfed other East and Southeast Asian groups as well as a 
broad swath of Pacific Islanders before veering westward to 
incorporate Indians and Pakistanis. Similarly, once the category of 
"Spanish-Speaking Americans" was rebranded "Hispanic," it came to 
include groups such as Brazilians who do not even speak Spanish.106 
Such category inflation did not just happen. Ethnic lobbies pushed 
for expanded definitions out of self-interest. 107 Federal officials 
obliged, basing their decisions on "bureaucratic convenience rather 
than careful ethnographic analysis." 108 The main premise seems to 
have been proximity of geographical origin (at least as judged from 
Washington, D.C.). In what other sense can Samoans be said to be 
ethnically "like" Chinese? Or Vietnamese "related to" Pakistanis? 
These groups come from vastly different cultures and look almost 
nothing alike. How then do we justify grouping them together? 
Such arbitrary origins and dubious ethnography might not matter if 
the categories we use make sense in the context of the United States 
today. The real question then is whether use of the quadrangle 
accords with the underlying purposes of affirmative action. Some 
commentators have expressed skepticism, arguing that any popular 
106 See Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting 
South American "Hispanics" can also be from Belize and British and French Guyana, 
none of whom speak Spanish or Portuguese); see also GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 191 
(questioning inclusion of Belize, Suriname, Guiana as non-Spanish speaking nations). 
107 Prior to 1971, South Asians and Iberians were both considered Caucasian. Each 
successfully petitioned the federal government to reclassify them as racial minorities 
based on conclusory allegations of ethnic disadvantage. La Noue & Sullivan, supra 
note 36, at 451-52. 
108 Id. at 459. Moreover, such decisions smack of double standards. The SBA 
turned down Persian Americans who had demonstrated undeniable evidence of racial 
prejudice on the ground that the record presented was insufficiently "longstanding," 
while letting in others, such as Tongans, who made even less of a showing. Id. at 453, 
465. 
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consensus surrounding the quadrangle remains superficial, with no 
connection to underlying reality. To George La Noue, "these 
categories are merely bureaucratic conveniences around which 
political constituencies have been constructed.,,109 Cunningham and 
his coauthors similarly criticize the quadrangle as "based on a mixture 
of inadequately examined folk categories and interest group 
politics." IlO 
Others defend the standard categories on the ground that they 
capture the sort of intangible, inter-subjective phenomena that are 
salient to affirmative action. This line of argument would seem to 
have little merit under the diversity rationale as originally presented in 
Bakke. As a proxy for viewpoint, the broad quadrangular categories 
are simply too blunt. ll1 Indeed, rather than conforming to existing 
stereotypes on race, the goal should be to challenge them. Il2 
Emphasizing the variation within group identities would encourage 
students to look beyond such stereotypes. 113 
In the context of remedial affirmative action, using categories that 
track the contours of societal prejudice makes more sense. After all, 
the basic law of remedies is to define the remedial class based on the 
scope of the injury.l14 David Hollinger argues that the quadrangular 
categories "serve well as predictors of the dynamicS of mistreatment, 
and thus as a foundation for initiatives designed to protect people 
against such mistreatment or to compensate them for it."ll5 The Tenth 
Circuit Similarly justifies use of the quadrangle based on "the harsh 
109 See La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 917. 
llO Cunningham et ai., supra note 25, at 879. 
III Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946-47 (5th Cir. 1996); McGowan, supra note 
61, at l35 ("Categorization by race or ethnicity fails to capture the complexity of 
social experience of many groups .... As a result, real diversity may suffer."). 
112 Cf. Metro. Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.s. 547, 615 (1990) (criticizing assumption 
of single "minority" viewpoint). 
113 The only justification for using broad categories would be to achieve a 
particular kind of viewpoint diversity: the shared viewpoint of minorities subjected to 
discrimination on the basis of existing racial stereotypes. But this argument, in effect, 
conflates the diversity justification with a remedial rationale. See McGowan, supra 
note 61, at l36. 
114 Cf. Mont. Contractors' Ass'n. v. Sec'y of Commerce, 460 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 
(D. Mont. 1978). "To define an Indian or a Black to determine who should be 
counted ... [youl looked at the actual discrimination being rectified and treated as 
Blacks or Indians the same kind of people that the defendants had treated as Blacks or 
Indians." Id. 
liS Hollinger, supra note 100, at 33. 
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fact that racial discrimination commonly occurs along lines of the 
broad categories." 116 
However, the extent to which the popular consensus on race maps 
the functional lines on which discrimination operates remains 
questionable. Are persons of European Spanish or Portuguese origin 
really subject to the kind of anti-Hispanic prejudices that Mexican 
Americans or Puerto Ricans experience in this country? The Seventh 
Circuit thought otherwise. ll7 Even though Iberians might fall within 
the popular meaning of "Hispanic," this functional test of racial 
meaning would justify excluding them from affirmative action. ll8 
Viewing race functionally in the context of discrimination might 
justify other departures from the conventional wisdom on race. 119 
Such questions are not just academic. Where we draw the lines 
determines who benefits from affirmative action. For example, 
Pakistanis are considered racially "Asian" and hence presumptively 
disadvantaged. Just across the Khyber Pass, Persians and Afghanis are 
relegated to "whiteness" and, as such, ineligible for affirmative 
action. 120 Yet, the racial boundary line dividing them seems to have 
116 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1185 (lOth Cir. 2000) 
. (rejecting need for further inquiries at level of subgroups); Cunningham et aI., supra 
note 25, at 872 (noting current categories make sense as "a prophylactic against 
anticipated future" discrimination). 
117 Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 
2001). One might Similarly question the logic of the "Asian Pacific Islander" category: 
are Samoans, Japanese, and Pakistanis really subject to a common set of stereotypes 
that distinguishes them from such supposedly "non-Asian" ethnic groups such as 
Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, and Mongolians that the federal definitions omit? CJ. Ritchey 
Produce Co. v. State, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, at *6 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1997) 
(criticizing Ohio's inclusion of South Asians, but not Lebanese, in its "Oriental" 
category). 
118 See Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4950, at *6. One sees a similar 
divergence between popular versus functional conceptions of race with black 
immigrant groups in New York City. Although most people would unquestionably 
identify Nigerians and Jamaicans as racially "black," these groups do not seem to 
attract the same degree of racial prejudice as African Americans. See Lee, supra note 
56, at 184. At least in the job market, employers have either learned to look beyond 
color and differentiate by subgroup, or are otherwise responsive to cultural nuances 
that permit such immigrants to evade the full brunt of racial prejudice. 
119 For example, Arabs and Persians might emerge as "functionally different" from 
European whites. Cf Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.s. 475, 479-82 (l954) (contrasting 
then-popular view of Mexican Americans as racially white with systematic prejudice 
that marked them as something "other," functional equivalent of separate race). 
120 A trial judge in Ohio found this truncated geography preposterous, declaring it 
"repugnant to our constitutional system of government [to] exclude a group of United 
States citizens ... [solely based on] the side of a river, a mountain range, or a desert 
their ancestor decided to settle." Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 87l, 877-
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rested on bureaucratic expediency rather than any evidence that the 
groups concerned experience discrimination differently in the United 
States. l2l 
Courts have seized on such definitional vagaries to attack 
affirmative action remedies for being overinclusive or underinclusive 
and thus failing the narrow tailoring test under strict scrutiny.122 
Indeed, some courts regard the inherent imprecision of racial remedies 
as effectively fatal. 123 By its very nature, race is messy, and there are 
no perfect answers.124 Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted 
that when it comes to affirmative action, strict scrutiny must not be 
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact."125 Finding "a permissible middle 
ground ... between [an] entirely individualized inquiry ... and an 
unconstitutionally sweeping, race-based generalization"126 therefore 
requires some criterion of categorical tailoring against which category 
definitions can be tested. 
Most affirmative action plans continue to adhere to the standard 
minority categories, often incorporating federal definitions verbatim. 
As we have seen, these definitions emerged in a fairly arbitrary 
process. Categories concocted without much thought were politically 
manipulated and expanded through dubious exercises in armchair 
ethnography, then blindly replicated and defended by entrenched 
interest groups. Such manipulation continues. For example, South 
78 (Ohio 1999). 
12l See supra notes 107-08. Indeed, Pakistanis never had to offer any evidence of 
racial subordination to win recognition as a "disadvantaged minority"; they were the 
passive beneficiaries of a petition for racial reclassification filed by Indian Americans. 
See La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 451-52. 
122 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 n.37 (5th Cir. 1996); Houston 
Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Transit Auth., 993 F. Supp. 545, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1997); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D. Colo. 1997); Ritchey 
Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, at *5-6. 
123 Adarand, 965 F. Supp. at 1580; Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, at 
*6-7. 
124 Cf Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 557 ("Race has never been either 
narrow or accurate"); Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev.,438 
F.3d 195, 210 (2d Cir. 2006). The court in Jana-Rock Construction stated, "[Wle find 
it difficult to imagine what a 'correct' racial classification would be. It will always 
exclude persons who have individually suffered past discrimination and include those 
who have not." ld. 
125 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.s. 200, 237 (1995). 
126 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 228 F.3d 1147, 1186 (lOth Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
district court's tailoring analysis because "[rlequiring that degree of precise fit would 
again render strict scrutiny 'fatal in fact"'). 
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Asians were retroactively added to Ohio's "Oriental" category by an 
executive order of the governor, which critics linked to campaign 
contributions from Indian donors. 127 Portuguese joined California's 
Hispanic category under similar circumstances. 128 
As one court summarized: "Race is politics, not biology." 129 It may 
be tempting to dismiss such definitional wrangling as the normal cut 
and thrust of identity politics. Yet, there are tangible benefits at stake 
on which people's livelihoods depend. It is one thing to argue that 
race is inherently subjective and that arbitrary divisions are inevitable. 
However, if the process by which such definitional lines are drawn is 
itself suspect, it becomes more difficult to justify according them a 
presumptive validity.130 
Another criticism of the standard federal categories is that they 
make no allowance for regional variation. As one court observed, 
"[T]he needs of the Japanese in Hawaii are [not] the same as those of 
the Japanese in California ... the needs of [American] Indians in New 
York are [not] the same as those of the Indians in Montana." 131 
Accordingly, the ubiquity of the ethno-racial quadrangle stands in 
uneasy tension with Croson's emphasis on particularized remedies. In 
Croson, the Court made a point of criticizing Richmond's use of 
beneficiary categories that did not reflect the city's demographic 
127 See Andrew Zajac, Inclusion of Asian Indians in Minority Contracting Causes 
Scandal in Ohio, AKRON BEACON]., May 15, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 5360734. 
128 Scott Herhold, Little Portugal Displays Its Political Savvy Seeking Contracts: 
'Minority' Classification Would Give Portuguese-American Businesses An Edge, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 28, 1996, at lB. 
129 Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 546. 
130 Because the choice of categories helps determine who is preferred (and who is 
excluded) on the basis of race, courts should arguably require some justification 
beyond the reflexive rubberstamping of federal definitions. See jana-Rock Constr., 
Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2006) (arguing 
New York needed to tailor its categories to its own context in order to comply with 
strict scrutiny). 
I3l Mont. Contractors' Ass'n. v. Sec'y of Commerce, 460 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (D. 
Mont. 1978); see also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,jR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 175 (1996) (distinguishing social position of Aleuts in 
Anchorage versus Richmond). 
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makeup.132 Such "random inclusion" of implausible groups in 
affirmative action cast doubt on Richmond's remedial intent. 133 
Following Croson's lead, lower courts have duly incorporated a 
"random inclusiveness" prong as part of their "strict scrutiny" of 
affirmative action. A Sixth Circuit panel found Ohio's definition of 
"Oriental" overinclusive, in part, because it included groups "who 
might never have been seen in Ohio until recently" such as Thai 
Americans. 134 Increasingly, courts are thus requiring justification for 
the categorical lines being drawn that goes beyond the reflexive rubber 
stamping of federal definitions.135 Rejecting "laundry list" approaches 
to category-making, they have pushed for greater sensitivity to 
regional context. 136 
However, none of these opinions offers a coherent account of how a 
"non-random" method of category-making would actually function. 
Without a theory of "non-random inclusiveness" or indeed any clear 
definition of what constitutes a "group," such inquiries have a 
suspiciously ad hoc flavor. Why are Thai Americans taken to be the 
132 Richmond v.j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469, 506 (1989) (criticizing inclusion of 
groups such as Aleuts and Eskimo when "[i]t may well be that Richmond has never 
had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen"). The Court also drew a broader distinction between 
Richmond's evidence of discrimination against blacks versus discrimination against 
the other minority groups that Richmond had included as beneficiaries. While the 
evidence of anti-black bias was ultimately deemed inadequate, the Court observed that 
there was "absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against" the non-black 
minority groups whatsoever. Id. at 506. 
133 Id. 
134 Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 2000); 
see also Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing 
same problem with Aleuts in California). San Francisco chose to omit Dominicans 
from its Hispanic category on similar grounds. Interview with Mara Rosales, Office of 
City Att'y, in S.F., Cal. (Feb. 2, 1998) (explaining Dominicans had not been 
represented in relevant population of contactors). 
135 SeeJana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 209-10 (holding New York State needed to "mak[e] 
an independent assessment of discrimination against [persons] of Spanish origin in 
New York" before including them in its Hispanic category) (emphasis added). 
136 Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 
2001); Monterey Mech. Co., 125 F .3d at 714 (speculating that "those who drafted the 
statute for the legislature copied from a model form and neglected to strike its 
inapplicable portions"); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 932-34 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(approving restriction of affirmative action categories to groups subject to historical 
discrimination in Texas); Houston Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Transit Auth., 993 F. 
Supp. 545, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (criticizing Texas for "cop[ying] whatever the federal 
government required to get federal funds without a determination of the reality of the 
categories or the applicability to Texas's experience"). 
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relevant unit of analysis whose presence or absence proved material in 
the Ohio case? Why not examine, say, Southeast Asians, or even 
Asians as a whole? Or, alternatively, why shouldn't the category be 
people from Bangkok?137 Once we have identified the salient group, 
how many members does it take to establish a legally cognizable 
presence? Does their presence have to be continuous? Would it 
matter if Ohio had evidence that local bigots cannot distinguish 
between Chinese and Thais? What if discrimination in the past has 
been solely against the former? Should the answer vary depending on 
whether the discrimination is ongoing? And what evidence should 
courts rely on to decide these questions? 
The judicial floundering such challenges have generated only 
confirms the undertheorized nature of the Who Question in U.s. law. 
Arguably, what's missing is a societal perspective grounded in 
empirical fact. In disagreeing as to whether Iberian Americans should 
be counted as Hispanic, the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all 
framed the issue as whether Iberians faced the same societal 
discrimination as other Hispanics. 138 Yet, in none of these cases was 
any attempt made to answer through evidence. Instead, courts justify 
their underlying intuitions by manipulating the burden of proof139 or 
rely on generalized ipse dixit as to the "nature of discrimination. ,,140 
C. The Limits of Antidiscrimination 
At the core, such disputes turn on an empirical understanding of the 
sOciopathology of racial bias. This brings us back to the challenge that 
Justice Powell saw as intractable: how to evaluate "amorphous" claims 
of societal discrimination? As we have seen, the Court has steadfastly 
declined to answer this question. This omission cannot be merely 
accidental. After four decades of affirmative action litigation, if the 
Court had wanted to probe the logiC of racial categories, it surely 
137 Almost any group definition will include an identifiable subset of people who 
were or are not actually "present" at some relevant time. To exclude them would 
require individualized analysis to a degree that would preclude group remedies based 
on race. 
138 Of course, the answer is unlikely to be all or nothing. One could assess the 
perceived "Hispanic-ness" of Iberians in terms of how often they are identified as 
Latino relative to other Hispanic subgroups. 
139 Builders Ass'n, 256 F.3d at 647; Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 211; Peightal v. Metro. 
Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1561 (1994); see also Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 
N.E.2d 871, 927 (Ohio 1999). 
140 Builders Ass'n, 256 F.3d at 642; Adarand Contr., Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 
1185 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
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could have found a way to do SO.141 The comments of individual 
justices writing outside the majority betray a noticeable disquietude at 
the unanswered questions the Who Question raises. Several members 
of the Court have suggested that singling out certain minority groups 
but not others for preferred treatment may violate equal protection. 142 
Yet, the Court's majority and plurality opinions have stuck doggedly 
within the confines of a majority/minority framework in which the 
question becomes whether racial preferences can be justified for 
anyone, rather than the merits of any particular group's claim. 143 
Viewed in this light, the Court's failure to address the logic of 
affirmative action categories can be seen as part of a larger pattern 
running through much of the Court's recent cases, namely the 
profound discomfort that the Court exhibits in coming to terms with 
race. 144 In contrast to the racial jurisprudence of the nineteenth 
century where courts freely indulged in the racial classification 
game,145 the modern Court shuns such inquiries, because it recognizes 
that there are no easy answers. Racial identities, the Court has 
belatedly acknowledged, reflect societal conventions more than 
141 The Supreme Court selects the cases it wants to review through grant of 
certiorari and can direct parties to brief additional issues it deems relevant. See Pildes 
& Niemi, supra note 49, at 498. 
142 For example, Justice Douglas questioned the preference shown to Filipinos, but 
not Japanese, by the University of Washington. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.s. 312, 
338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). likewise, Justice Powell suggested that the list 
of groups targeted by University of California was both underinclusive, Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265, 292, 309 n.45 (1978) (stating "the University is 
unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups"), and overinclusive, id. 
at 309 n.45 ("The inclusion of [Asians) is especially curious in light of the substantial 
numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions process"). See also Metro. 
Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
enumeration of preferred racial groups as underinclusive); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537-39 
(1980) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (suggesting selection of preferred classes failed rational 
basis test). Justice Kennedy has also questioned the politics underlying specific 
category definitions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, ]. 
dissenting) (relating attempt to exclude Cubans from Hispanic group "on the grounds 
that [they) were Republicans"). 
143 Cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35, "We are not asked to determine whether groups 
other than those favored ... should similarly be favored. All we are asked to do is to 
pronounce the constitutionality of [the affirmative action)." ld. The one notable 
exception is Croson. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
144 Cf Pildes & Niemi, supra note 49, at 498 (noting "the caution and tentativeness 
that characterizes the current Court's approach to race"). 
145 HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 98, at 4-9. 
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biological truth. 146 However, rather than undertaking an accounting 
of such social realities, the Court prefers to rhetorically distance itself, 
referring to race instead in terms of its most superficial attribute -
skin color. 147 
Indeed, the very model of strict scrutiny that defines the modern 
Court's equal protection jurisprudence posits race as an irrelevant, 
even distasteful phenomena to be tolerated only under extreme 
circumstances. The problem with a doctrinal structure premised on 
dismissing race as an irrelevancy is that affirmative action is one area 
where, by hypothesis, race does matter. 148 The question is how? 
Redefining affirmative action as a project confined to discrete 
contexts such as university admissions or municipal contracting 
cabins this inquiry. By reconceiving racism as discrete acts of 
prejudice within a limited context, the Court obscures the underlying 
societal dynamiCS of racial disadvantage. 149 Likewise, stressing the 
instrumental value of racial identities as an educational tool shifts the 
focus away from the societal context in which such identities function. 
Yet, as we have seen, by telling us how to count heads, but not 
which heads to count, the Supreme Court does not so much answer 
the larger societal questions as deflect them. By relying on numbers to 
sort through the complexities of race, the Court abstracts the question 
of selection from the problem of definition. The Court's failure to 
provide a functional definition of racial identity leaves policymakers to 
adhere to the quadrangle by default, which means counting categories 
that are themselves suspect, the product of the same "unthinking 
stereotypes or ... racial politics" that the Court has feared all along. 150 
To confront the Who Question ultimately means navigating the 
minefield of race and addressing its enduring significance in society. 
Faced with this challenge, Justices Powell and O'Connor recoiled, 
declining to engage in the "variable sociological and political analysis" 
reqUired. Indeed, Justice Powell not only questioned whether such 
analysis was feasible, but also whether it would be desirable. 151 
146 St. Francis ColI. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.s. 604,610 n.4 (1987). 
147 See Gotanda, supra note 18, at 40. An extreme example of such rhetorical 
distancing is Justice Thomas' dissent in Grutter. 539 U.s. at 355 n.3 (Thomas, j., 
dissenting) (likening racial preferences to "aesthetic" of skin color). 
148 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 244, 299-301 nn.1-7 (2003) (Ginsburg, j., 
dissenting) (giving statistics to document); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (majority 
opinion). 
149 Gotanda, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
150 Richmond v.j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469, 510 (1989). 
151 See id. 
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Instead, Powell retreated into a kind of historical relativism in which 
everyone has suffered and thus no one claim stands above another. 
Both theoretically and empirically, this accounting of racial equities 
seems seriously flawed. Even if other groups have suffered 
historically, the real issue is where the burdens of societal 
discrimination fall today.152 Whether conceived of in terms of 
lingering effects or ongoing patterns of exclusion, contemporary 
evidence of racial disparities seems indisputable. 153 Yet Justices 
O'Connor and Powell seem to confuse this point almost willfully. 
They situate societal discrimination entirely in the past and then plead 
helplessness before the fog of history. 
Justice Ginsburg challenges such evasiveness in dissenting opinions, 
citing a wealth of social science research documenting present day 
racial disparities which persist "[ il n the wake of 'a system of racial 
caste only recently ended."'154 Members of racial minorities - in 
particular Hispanics and blacks - are shown to fare much worse than 
whites across a wide range of societal indicators, ISS as well as in audit 
studies documenting disparate treatment directly.156 On its face, such 
scholarship would seem to belie Justice O'Connor's claim that the 
effects of societal discrimination are "inherently unmeasurable." 
Commentators have also challenged the Court's reasoning. They 
argue the Court's indifference to societal discrimination flies in the 
face of the Equal Protection Clause's historical origins as a vehicle for 
"negro emancipation." 157 They see the Court's emphasis on the 
personal nature of the equality right and its privileging of process over 
outcome as providing an incomplete account. 15S Moreover, the 
152 See Richmond, 488 U.s. at 510; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 463 (1980) 
(stating purpose of preferential remedies is to address present effect of past 
discrimina tion). 
153 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, ]., 
dissenting) (citing empirical evidence of "discrimination's lingering effects"); Ashar &: 
Opoku, supra note 2, at 237-38 (documenting "continuing discrimination"). 
154 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 244, 299-303 &: nn.1-9 (2003) (Ginsburg,]., 
dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 272 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting). 
155 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 272 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting); Ashar &: Opoku, supra note 
2, at 237-38; see also Brief of the Am. Sociological Ass'n et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 306 (2003); (No. 02-241). 
156 Audit studies typically involve matched "testers" with identical credentials who 
apply for jobs, loans, or housing in order to assess the effects of the applicant's race 
with other factors being equal. Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of 
Employment Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &: SOc. SCI. 104, 109-14 (2007). 
157 Ashar &: Opoku, supra note 2, at 235-37. 
158 See Gotanda, supra note 18, at 40-47; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1314-18. 
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Court's conclusory assertions about the unmeasurability of societal 
discrimination ring hollow in light of the abundant evidence of 
enduring racial inequalities. Its transparent attempt to portray such 
evidence as the remnant of a distant, murky past seems particularly 
duplicitous. 159 The Court's stated concerns about judicial competence 
are therefore dismissed as a mask to advance its underlying agenda of 
color-blindness. The Court's feigned helplessness is just another act 
in a series of crocodile tears shed at the altar of white privilege. 16o 
Such critics have called for an alternative approach that would 
reinterpret equal protection review as concerned not with the form of 
state action, but rather its substantive effect. 161 Instead of scrutinizing 
racial classifications, the goal would be to eradicate racial 
hierarchies. 162 A societal perspective would replace the narrow focus 
on individuals. Under such a reading of equality, affirmative action 
would become a vehicle for enforcing equality directly, rather than a 
suspect and narrowly tolerated deviation from it. 163 
Justice Ginsburg'S invocation of the rhetoric of "racial caste" in 
Gratz v. Bollinger seems an implicit endorsement of such an 
antisubordination approach and repudiation of the Court's apparent 
indifference to societal inequality.164 Yet, is the topography of racial 
inequality as readily mapped as Justice Ginsburg's statistics seem to 
suggest? Moreover, even if societal evidence could be meaningfully 
evaluated, perhaps we should decline the opportunity on political 
grounds as Justice Powell cautioned. When it comes to race, is 
dabbling in societal reengineering so fraught with danger that it 
should be avoided? Other members of the Court have conjured 
ominous visions of such a project, invoking Nazi Germany and 
159 See Ashar &: Opoku, supra note 2, at 223 (stating judicial indifference to 
continuing discrimination "wanant[s] skepticism about the [Court's] good faith"). 
160 See Harris, supra note 17, at 287-88; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.s. 279, 315-
19 (1987) (pleading lack of institutional competency to counter discriminatory 
application of death penalty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.s. 229, 247-48 (1976) 
(declining to exercise constitutional review over disparate impacts). 
161 Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 105-06; see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Discrimination Through Equal Protection, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 14, at 
29-30. 
162 See Harris, supra note 17, at 289-90. The Court has taken notice of de facto 
caste systems in other contexts. See Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.s. 475, 476-77 (1954) 
(describing social exclusion of Mexican Americans); cf. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, 
Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race To Latcrit Theory, 85 CAl. L. REV. 1143, 1163 
(1997) (arguing for generalization of Hernandez approach). 
163 Simmons, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
164 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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Apartheid South Africa as the legal precedents we would have to draw 
upon to deal with the classificatory challenges entailed. 165 Yet, these 
admittedly distasteful examples do not exhaust the list of available 
models. There is another country that has committed itself to societal 
reengineering which may offer a more appealing precedent. That 
country is India. 
II. LESSONS FROM ABROAD: DOES INDIA HOLD THE ANSWER? 
A. India's Empirical Approach 
Like the United States, India is a diverse, multi-ethnic democracy 
struggling to overcome the legacy of centuries of offiCially sanctioned 
segregation and discrimination. Although Indian affirmative action 
focuses on caste, not race, there are close parallels. In both cases, 
beneficiary groups are defined primarily by ancestry (unlike, for 
example, Brazilian affirmative action, which is based on color).166 
India and the United States also share the common challenge of 
sorting through competing claims to entitlement from multiple groups 
(unlike, for example, in Malaysia or Sri Lanka, where affirmative 
action focuses solely on one group).167 Like the United States, India 
operates under a common law tradition. Its written constitution 
interpreted by an activist judiciary adheres closely to the U.S. model of 
public law. 168 In addition, India and the United States both operate 
federal systems in which responsibility for administering preferential 
policies is divided across multiple layers of government, further 
complicating claSSificatory decision making. 169 
165 Metro Broad, Inc. v. FCC., 497 U.s. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (citing facetiously to South African Apartheid statute); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.s. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (drawing analogy to 
Nazi Reich Citizenship Law). 
166 Seth Racusen, Making the "Impossible" Determination: Flexible Identity and 
Targeted Opportunity in Contemporary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REV. 787,826 (2004). 
167 See Sowell, supra note 93, at 56, 84-88 (comparing affirmative action poliCies of 
MalaYSia and Sri Lanka). 
168 Cunningham & Menon, supra note 27, at 1305-07. In this respect, India's legal 
system has more in common with the United States than other common law systems 
whose adherence to traditional notions of parliamentary supremacy inhibit the role 
that courts play in policymaking. 
169 Laura Dudley Jenkins, Race, Case, and Justice: Social Science Categories and 
Antidiscrimination Policies in India and the United States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 747, 759 
(2004). 
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Unlike the u.s. Supreme Court, however, which rejected any 
attempt to measure societal discrimination, India has developed a 
rather sophisticated methodology to measure such effects empirically. 
It uses such measures to select affirmative action beneficiaries. The 
criteria relied on have been studied by several high-profile national 
commissions and extensively litigated, with several cases reaching the 
Indian Supreme Court. 170 
The purpose of affirmative action in India is to remedy the societal 
effects of caste discrimination. 17l Caste is somewhat different from 
race. While racial distinctions in the United States are often associated 
with visible differences in physical appearance (skin color for 
example), in India, caste distinctions are conceived of most 
fundamentally as a matter of societal status. 172 The caste system began 
as a hierarchical system of social ordering within the framework of 
traditional Hindu belief. Based on birth, caste membership 
determined one's station in society. Groups at the top of the hierarchy 
enjoyed superior resources, status, and privilege, while those at the 
bottom endured ostracism and abuse. 173 
There were five main categories in the traditional caste system. 
Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras made up the four official 
castes or varnas. Beneath them (and outside the formal caste system) 
were the outcastes, or so-called "untouchables." At each of these five 
levels, the broader categories divide into smaller caste groups known 
as jatis (or jats). The jatis were the focus of caste identities; they 
determined what you did for a living, where you lived, the deities you 
worshipped, the foods you ate, and whom you could marry. Even 
today, such identities exert powerful influence on Indian life. To be 
born to a lower caste retains an enduring stigma. 174 
170 Cunningham & Menon, supra note 27, at 1304-06. 
171 Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) A.I.R. 1993 S.c. 477, 504-05 (India). 
India's hiStory of preferential policies extends back to British rule. Quotas (or 
"reservations") have become a ubiquitous feature of Indian public life. A specified 
percentage of civil service posts, university admissions, and even parliamentary seats 
are reserved for members of groups deemed disadvantaged in Indian society. 
172 While the lower castes are sometimes associated with darker complexions and 
broader noses, it is not generally possible to tell a person's caste by visual inspection. 
Nonetheless, there are subtle clues, such as family name, and dietary and religious 
practices, from which an educated guess can be made. See Jenkins, supra note 25, at 
46-52,60 (describing dubious attempts by British colonial anthropologists to correlate 
caste with physiognomic differences, such as "nasal index" measurements). 
173 Cunningham & Menon, supra note 27, at 1302. 
174 Sowell, supra note 93, at 25-27. 
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Despite the differences in context, one can draw at least a superficial 
analogy as to the organizing schema under which caste and race 
function. The five broad caste categories parallel the five racial groups 
identified in the United States. Just as varna are composed of smaller 
subgroups -jatis - racial groups in the United States can be broken 
down by ethnicity or national origin. 175 While jati and varna stand in 
a very different SOciological relationship than race and ethnicity, the 
key point is that Indian affirmative action focuses on the smaller 
groups - the jatis - whereas the United States focuses on much 
broader categories. 176 
Officially, caste discrimination has been banned. Yet, as with 
segregation in the United States, patterns of disadvantage continue. 
And because the caste system had a pyramidical structure, there are 
many groups in the lower echelons that can plausibly claim to 
experience such disadvantage - not unlike the "majority of 
minorities" that Justice Powell talked about in Bakke. However, where 
Powell rejected any attempt to choose between competing groups, 
India does exactly that. 
The starting point in this process remains the caste hierarchy. For 
the groups at the very bottom - the so-called "Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes" - traditional status alone determines eligibility.177 Under the 
Indian constitution, these groups are automatically allotted a 
"reservation" (quota) for all civil service jobs, university admissions, 
and electoral representation. 178 
For a much larger group of affirmative action beneficiaries, however, 
known as the "other backward classes" ("OBC), caste disadvantage is 
no longer presumed from traditional status alone. 179 Some lower caste 
groups have become landowners and gained political power. Others 
have moved to urban areas where economic opportunities enable 
upward mobility. In some cases, lower castes have even succeeded in 
175 The jatis were also subject to traditional hierarchies within each varna, although 
the relative rankings were generally less well-defined and could change over time. Id. 
at 162-63. 
176 Sowell, supra note 93, at 48, 185-66. 
177 The Scheduled Castes consist mostly of the former untouchables (now known 
as Dalits),· while the Scheduled Tribes comprise tribal groups isolated from 
mainstream society. 
178 Jenkins, supra note 25, at 2. 
179 The term "backward classes" comes from the Indian Constitution and has been 
interpreted to transcend traditional caste status and incorporate a broader assessment 
of social standing. See Balaji v. Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.c. 649,650 (India). The aBC 
receive a separate quota from the Scheduled groups. 
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redefining their caste status upwards. ISO Therefore, in order to be 
included in affirmative action set-asides, each jati has to demonstrate 
that it's still "backward," a term of art in Indian affirmative action 
law. lSI 
The process of identifying backward classes remains the 
responsibility of provincial governments as caste differences vary by 
region. Each province compiles initial lists of eligible groups based on 
a comprehensive review of the local populace. ls2 "Backwardness" is 
determined empirically by looking at a wide range of socioeconomic 
indicators. The data is collected and analyzed on a group-by-group 
basis. In other words, the jati as a whole forms the unit of analysis. 
The criteria examined are supposed to be specifically chosen to 
identify the systemic effects of caste disadvantage. ls3 
Both the breadth of criteria and level of detail to which such analysis 
extends are impressive. One standard form used to collect this 
information runs over seventeen pages. IS4 The factors considered 
include the average income and education level of caste members,ls5 
literacy rates, occupational profiles,ls6 land ownership, capital 
resources, political representation (i.e., number of caste members 
occupying elective or civil servant posts), housing quality, and access 
to infrastructure (roads, electricity, irrigation, etc.). The form also 
inquires whether the caste's position has improved or deteriorated 
during the last twenty years and requires applicants to furnish names 
of comparable caste groups at similar levelS. IS7 
180 M.N. SRINIVAS, COLLECTED ESSAYS 200 (2002). 
181 "Backward classes" need not be defined strictly by caste. Non-Hindu groups -
Christians, Muslims - can also attain OBC status if they meet the "backwardness" 
standard. SeeJenkins, supra note 25, at 197-214; Jenkins, supra note 169, at 754. 
182 Groups left excluded from the central OBC list can apply independently for 
inclusion by furnishing their own evidence of "backwardness." 
183 Indian affirmative action thus aims at corrective as well as distributional justice. 
Cunningham &: Menon, supra note 27, at 1307. 
184 See Jenkins, supra note 25, at 197-214 (discussing "[q]uestionnaire for 
consideration of requests for inclusion and complaints of under-inclusion in the 
central list of Other Backward Classes"). 
185 Id. at 208-09; see also Sawhney v. Union of India, A.l.R. 1993 S.c. 477, 562 
(India) (stating income is permissible criteria to assess OBC, but only when 
accompanied by other factors). 
186 For example, the form inquires whether the caste is identified with a traditional 
occupation, whether such hereditary occupation is regarded as "lowly, undignified, 
unclear or stigmatized" or subject to bonded labor, and what proportion of the caste is 
still engaged in such occupation. Id. at 204-05. 
187 Id. at 214. 
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Wherever possible, the data are supposed to be disaggregated even 
below the jati level. Thus, if an identifiable subgroup of the caste is 
doing much better than the others, "backwardness" should be 
appraised for each subgroup separately so that the more "forward" 
subgroup can be potentially excluded. Similarly, individual caste 
members who have enjoyed an unusually privileged background may 
also be deemed ineligible. 188 
In other words, India attempts to choose beneficiary groups using 
preCisely the "SOciological and political analysis" that Justice Powell 
thought could not or should not be attempted in the United States. 
However, rather than attempt to sort between competing historical 
claims of past discrimination, India focuses on the here and now. 189 
The idea is that groups shown to experience systemic disadvantage 
across a wide array of societal indicators can be presumed to be the 
ones most afflicted by discrimination. India thus answers the Who 
Question empirically. Instead of accepting the existence of caste 
hierarchies as frozen in time, India defines caste functionally in terms 
of subordination. It then quantifies such subordination through 
empirical proxies and targets its affirmative action accordingly. 
In drawing inferences of discrimination from empirical measures, 
Indian methodology superficially resembles the underrepresentation 
model of Croson. Both rely on counting - using quantitative 
measures to determine affirmative action eligibility. However, very 
different kinds of counting are involved. Whereas India focuses on 
societal disadvantage, Croson confines its analysis to particularized 
contexts. India also employs a multifactoral, systemic analysis, 
whereas counting in the United States focuses solely on a single 
indicator: group representation. 
The units being counted are also sized very differently. Most 
affirmative action programs operate within the standard four 
"minority" categories, roughly analogous to India's varnas. Samoans 
are thus lumped together with Pakistanis in a pan-Asian grouping 
counted en masse. By contrast, India's counting focuses on the jatis -
the smaller units that make up each varna. The analogy in the u.s. 
context would be to analyze Samoans and Pakistanis separately. 
Fundamentally different assumptions underlie these quantitative 
measures. In the United States, a statistically Significant disparity is 
188 This skimming off of the so-called "creamy layer" of caste elites is 
constitutionally required. See Sawhney, A.l.R. 1993 S.c. at 588-89. Thus, aBC 
membership only creates a presumption of eligibility. 
189 See id. at 556 (rejecting retrospective rationale of compensating for past injury). 
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taken as prima facie evidence of unlawful discrimination. In other 
words, the counting is (at least in theory) supposed to uncover actual 
"statutory or constitutional violations" traceable to the very institution 
seeking to grant the remedy. By contrast, India makes no effort to 
assign individual responsibility. It seeks to measure the systemic 
effects of enduring caste discrimination irrespective of their cause. 190 
To some extent these different emphases can be ascribed to 
differences in the way race and caste are conceived. In the United 
States, race is often considered an immutable trait, inhering in highly 
visible (albeit superficial and morally irrelevant) characteristics such 
as skin color. 191 As a result, racial discrimination is conceived of in 
terms of discrete acts of irrational prejudice triggered by such 
phenotypic differences - a matter of individuals responding 
inappropriately to "racial" stimuli. 192 Remedying discrimination thus 
entails neutralizing individual bad actors, as opposed to effecting 
broader institutional change. 193 
In India, however, caste is less associated with immutable traits than 
with explicit social hierarchies. It is thus more natural to think of 
caste discrimination as a societal problem that must be addressed 
systemically. In order to remedy such discrimination, the social 
hierarchies themselves must be attacked and rendered invisible. 194 
India also differs in its allocation of decisional authority to an 
administrative process only indirectly supervised by the judiciary.195 
By contrast, the constitutionalization of racial policy in the United 
States precludes similar efforts at social reengineering. The Supreme 
Court has rejected societal remedies because of concerns over judiCial 
competence. Yet, its distrust of racial politics means the Court will 
not allow other branches to act in its stead. 196 
190 Cf Freeman, supra note 161, at 29-30 (contrasting "perpetrator vs. victim" 
perspectives on discrimination). 
191 Indeed, "color" is often used synonymously with race. 
192 Gotanda, supra note 18, at 43-45. 
193 ld. 
194 Cunningham &: Menon, supra note 27, at 1304. 
195 See id. at 1306-07; infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
196 As Justice O'Connor explained, "[O]ur history will adequately support a 
legislative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political 
strength to negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members." Richmond v. j.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989). The inability of courts to measure societal 
discrimination raises the "danger that [putative remedies are] merely the product of 
unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics." ld. at 510. The inability of courts 
to control societal rationales means they cannot be relied on legislatively. ld. at 497, 
506; Sean Pager, Strictness and SubSidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on Affinnative 
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B. From India to the United States: Applying the Model 
For some, the Indian approach based on societal disadvantage offers 
a more attractive means of selecting beneficiaries. The preoccupation 
with identifying intentional bias in U.S. law has been criticized for 
employing unrealistic assumptions about the etiology of 
discrimination. 197 Rather than focusing myopically on identifiable 
"bad actors," commentators have stressed the need to address systemic 
patterns of disadvantage. 19B In proposing this paradigm shift from 
antidiscrimination to antisubordination, Sunstein tellingly uses the 
metaphor of a constitutional "Anticaste Principle," and, in fact, his 
definition of "caste" in terms of systemic societal disadvantage is 
reminiscent of the way India actually goes about identifying 
"backwardness." 199 
That India offers a working model of an antisubordination program 
has not gone unnoticed by scholars of comparative affirmative 
action. 2°O In advocating India's approach to the u.s. Supreme Court, 
Cunningham and his fellow scholars on the amicus brief made the 
case that the empirical validation supplied by Indian methodology 
should put to rest judicial concerns over the "amorphous" nature of 
societal discrimination.2Ol Moreover, Sunstein and Cunningham both 
highlight the institutional advantages of shifting responsibility over 
questions of structural equality from the judiciary to the political 
branches. 202 
Action at the European Court ofJustice, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 35, 70 (2003). 
197 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1239-41 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 432-44 (1987). 
198 Freeman, supra note 161, at 30, 35. Some commentators also argue that the 
Court's existing jurisprudence already contains the seeds for such a paradigm shift. 
E.g., Haney L6pez, supra note 162, at 1200. 
199 Cunningham & Menon, supra note 27, at 1302-06; Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994). 
200 Cunningham et ai., supra note 25, at 874-75; Cunningham & Menon, supra 
note 27, at 1302-06. 
201 Brief, supra note 28; Cunningham et ai., supra note 25, at 874, 881 ("India's 
experience shows without a doubt that it is possible to design a program to remedy 
the effect of past discrimination in which beneficiary groups are designated through 
an objective process based on empirical research."). 
202 See Cunningham et ai., supra note 25, at 858-59; Sunstein, supra note 199, at 
2412-13,2440 (describing "superior democratic pedigree and fact-finding capacities" 
of legislative and administrative bodies). 
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On its face, the multifactoral analysis applied under the Indian 
approach does seem like a more rational answer to the Who Question. 
Whereas Croson tells us simply to count heads without much thought 
about their underlying meaning, India employs empirical measures 
speCifically chosen to correlate with the social phenomenon being 
targeted. Moreover, by analyzing the narrowest possible units -jatis 
instead of varnas - using definitions tailored to local context, the 
Indian approach achieves a greater degree of precision which helps to 
avoid overinclusive or underinclusive remedies and thus reduces the 
concern over definitional issues. 203 
India is able to work with smaller units because it is looking at caste 
societally, using a composite of many factors to map social hierarchies. 
In looking at this broader picture of underprivilege, group size 
becomes less of a limitation than with Croson's particularized analyses 
in which statistical significance is often a limiting factor. By 
determining affirmative action eligibility through a centralized 
process, India's approach is also more efficient than the separate 
disparity studies that Croson demands for each remedial context. 
Moreover, unlike racial definitions in the United States, Indian 
methodology responds to regional variations in caste identities. 
How might such a model translate to the U.S. context? To return to 
the Iberian cases discussed above, recall that the key question was 
whether Iberians experienced the same patterns of racial disadvantage 
as other Hispanics. Applying Indian methodology, this question could 
be answered by analyzing empirical data. 
The idea would be to use societal disadvantage as a proxy for racial 
subordination. This would entail gathering statistics on Iberians and 
other Hispanic subgroups, using appropriate criteria deSigned to 
quantify patterns of subordination in the United States. This might 
include. examining access to education, average household wealth, 
patterns of residential segregation, rates of interracial marriage,204 
political representation, and a host of similar criteria. If it turns out 
that Iberians do much better on these measures than Latinos, this 
203 Smaller groups also generally have better defined identities, a phenomenon that 
applies in the United States as much as in India. Cj. Cunningham & Menon, supra 
note 27, at l305, 1309-10. (describing benefits of disaggregating current affirmative 
action categories and shifting remedial focus to subgroups). Therefore, while 
counting small groups does not eliminate definitional ambiguity, it minimizes it. 
204 See Cunningham et aI., supra note 25, at 873 n.216 (pointing to intermarriage 
rates and patterns of white flight). 
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could mean they are not experiencing the same patterns of 
discrimination.20s 
In fact, data from the 2000 U.s. Census reveal that on several such 
measures, Iberians are differently situated from other Hispanic groups. 
They are significantly wealthier, better educated, and engaged in 
higher status occupations than Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, 
who make up the bulk of u.s. Hispanics;206 indeed, on many measures 
Iberians outperform the U.S. population at large. Almost twice as 
many American Spaniards, for example, hold a graduate degree than 
the U.s. average; they are twenty-five percent better represented in 
managerial or professional occupations; and they own homes valued at 
thirty-six percent above the national median. 207 Mexican Americans 
and Puerto Ricans living on the U.s. Mainland, by contrast, rank well 
below the U.s. average on all of these measures. 208 
205 As in India, allowance should also be made for possible regional variations. 
206 Mexican Americans (or Chicanos) are by far the largest Hispanic subgroup 
represented almost 60% of the total. Puerto Ricans account for just under lOo,6. See 
infra Appendix for Census data on Hispanic subgroups. 
207 Portuguese Americans do slightly less well than Spaniards on these measures. 
They are somewhat less likely to hold a college degree or be a manager or professional 
than the average u.s. resident. But they experience poverty at only two-thirds the 
national rate and the median value of their homes exceeds that of the general populace 
by 34%. See infra Table 3. 
208 Mexican Americans, for example, earn graduate degrees at a quarter the rate of 
the U.S. average; they are only half as well-represented in the managerial and 
professional classes; and their home values rank 20% below the national median. See 
infra Table 3. 
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Table 3. Socioeconomic Breakdown of Hispanic Subgroups 
Education Occupation Propert~ Income 
Population % Earning Degree Managerial or Median Home % Below 
Group Bachelors Graduate Professional Value Poverty Level 
ALL U.S. 15.5% 8.8% 33.6% $119,600 12.4% 
HISPANIC 6.7% 3.8% 18.1% $105,600 22.6% 
Argentinean 16.2% 19.0% 42.5% $180,000 13.8% 
Spaniard 16.2% 13.7% 42.0% $162,100 12.7% 
Portuguese 13.0% 6.0% 29.9% $160,100 8.1% 
South 
American 14.5% 10.6% 27.7% $153,100 15.0% 
Cuban 11.5% 9.6% 31.6% $135,700 15.0% 
Central 
American 6.2% 3.4% 13.3% $131,400 19.9% 
• 
Puerto Rican 8.3% 4.2% 24.2% $112,500 26.0% 
Mexican 5.0% 2.4% 14.9% $95,300 23.5% 
BLACKS 9.5% 4.8% 25.2% $80,600 24.9% 
Source: 2000 U.s. Census 
If one accepts such societal indicators as appropriate criteria to 
determine affirmative action eligibility, the case for including Iberians 
seems weak. 209 Even if the popular consensus would regard them as 
Hispanic, they appear less burdened by the systemic handicaps 
associated with the larger group yo It may be that the success of 
Spaniards comes in spite of race, not because of it. But it is more 
likely that these differences in societal standing reflect genuine 
differences in how such subgroups experience race. Scholars have 
identified intra-Hispanic disparities based on skin color.211 The lighter 
209 A similar argument could be made for excluding Hispanics of South American 
and Cuban origin. Argentine Americans fare particularly well on these measures, 
outstripping even Spaniards. 
210 The popular consensus is, in any case, influenced by the terms on which formal 
race categories are constructed. Shifting to a narrower Latino classification would 
arguably reduce the tendency of the public to associate Iberians with other Hispanics. 
211 See Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black And White Anymore, Why Does 
Darkness Cast A Longer Discriminatory Shadow Than Lightness? An Investigation And 
Analysis Of The Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 133-34 (1997); Edward E. 
Telles &: Edward Murguia, Phenotypic Discrimination and Income Differences Among 
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skin and European features of Spaniards could permit them to 
function more easily in mainstream U.s. society. Moreover, class 
differences may themselves insulate societally successful Hispanics 
from the patterns of prejudice that other group members encounter. 
This does not mean that Iberians never encounter racial prejudice, 
but it does suggest that, like Jews or Irish, they have learned to 
navigate around it. And we may want to focus our affirmative action 
efforts on groups that are being held back. Since most affirmative 
action definitions of "Hispanic" still include Iberians, a disadvantage 
approach would lead to a narrowing of eligibility in this case. 
Cunningham and his collaborators proposed to generalize such 
inquiries to "redraw the map" around which our racial compass is 
oriented. They called for a "national bipartisan commission" to be 
convened to replace the standard categories of the quadrangle with 
Scientifically redeSigned groupings built around systemic 
disadvantage. 212 Newly fashioned empirically validated categories 
could then serve to allocate affirmative action remedies in a more 
targeted, rationally defensible fashion. 213 
India's example of selecting affirmative action beneficiaries directly 
based on societal disadvantage closely approximates the 
antisubordination approach to affirmative action championed by u.s. 
scholars. The Indian model therefore serves as a useful thought 
experiment to examine the viability of such an alternative model. 
C. Demographic Challenges 
Could an Indian-style disadvantage model provide a workable 
answer to the Who Question as such commentators suggest? There 
are Significant differences in moving to the U.S. context that would 
complicate the analysis. Moreover, even if such an approach proved 
workable, a further question remains whether the consequences would 
be desirable. Arguably, Justice Powell was right to resist societal 
rankings as a matter of practical politics. If so, the Indian model may 
serve as a negative example, more of a cautionary lesson than a model 
to emulate. Exploring the reasons why points to some of the dangers 
lurking within the Who Question. 
Mexican Americans, 71 Soc. SCI. Q. 682, 693-94 (1990) (finding evidence of greater 
labor market discrimination against Mexican Americans with darker skin than those 
with lighter, more European complexion). 
212 Cunningham et aI., supra note 25, at 880-81. 
213 ld. at 882. 
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First, consider the demographic contrasts. India remains a largely 
rural society in which patterns of caste oppression have been 
entrenched literally over millennia. As a result, caste identities remain 
well-defined. 214 Most caste groups still live in their traditional villages 
and engage in time-honored occupations. Inter-caste marriage is 
virtually unknown. Given these relatively stable baseline conditions, 
Indian policymakers can generally presume that empirical 
disadvantage flows from the lingering effects of caste, as opposed to 
extrinsic causes. 
By contrast, the United States is a nation of immigrants, with a high 
degree of geographic and social mobility. Although "ethnic niches" in 
the workforce still exist/IS occupational diversity is increaSingly the 
rule. Ethnic and racial identities are not as well-defined, and 
interracial marriage rates are rising. All of this makes the dynamics of 
group disadvantage much more difficult to model because, as Justices 
O'Connor and Powell noted, it requires analyses of amorphous, 
moving targets. 216 
Dealing with immigration effects would present a particular 
challenge, one which Cunningham and his coauthors largely disregard 
and which many subordination theorists overlook. 217 Immigrants 
typically arrive in positions of relative disadvantage and then progress 
up the socioeconomic ladder. In general, the longer they have been in 
the country, the better they do. 218 Such immigration effects skew 
socioeconomic measures of status, and for groups with high rates of 
immigration, the distortions can be appreCiable. Yet, affirmative 
action, properly understood, should target racial disadvantage that 
214 This is not to deny the phenomenon of caste mobility, nor to deny the existence 
of gray areas in caste identity. The point is merely a comparative one: caste remains a 
much more stable marker of identity in India than race in the United States. 
215 See generally Malamud, supra note 50, at 327-29 (describing how certain ethnic 
groups gravitate to certain occupational niches). 
216 See Richmond v.j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469,506 (1989) (describing "mosaic 
of shifting preferences"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292, 
296-97 (1978) (describing need for constant re-ranking of groups). 
217 Cunningham and his coauthors begin with a "mad bomber" parable that posits 
a model of lingering disadvantage traceable to a unitary injury at time zero. 
Cunningham et aI., supra note 25, at 836. While their model contemplates internal 
migrations by the original inhabitants subsequent to their bombing injury, it fails to 
address the potential for immigration itself to constitute an independent source of 
"injury" as a causal phenomenon correlating with societal disadvantage. Nor does the 
model contemplate new or ongoing sources of racial prejudice. 
218 Many components contribute to success in navigating U.s. society: familiarity 
with U.s. customs, employment skills, language ability, social capital ("connections"), 
financial resources, and others. All of these take time to cultivate. 
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goes beyond such transitory phenomena. Unlike traditional welfare 
policies grounded in distributional equity, affirmative action takes its 
moral force from a corrective justice ideal. It targets a specific type of 
disadvantage arising from a morally irrelevant and seemingly 
immutable characteristic - race - the dynamicS of which operate on 
a societal scale whose fundamental injustice transcends individual 
circumstances. 219 Moreover, affirmative action remedies function on a 
collective level that captures positive externalities beyond the 
individual recipients. 22o At its most ambitious, affirmative action seeks 
nothing less than to remake SOCiety in anew, less prejudicial image. 221 
To accomplish this goal, we need appropriate adjustments to identify 
patterns of "intractable disadvantage" unrelated to immigration.222 
This is more easily said than done. Adjusting for immigration 
effects requires dealing with myriad causal variables. Immigrants 
begin at differing starting points and their ability to progress also 
varies, based on the circumstances they face upon arrival. 223 Many 
Mexicans and Central Americans come across the border, often 
illegally, from poor, rural communities, with little education, and then 
remain concentrated in lingUistically isolated communities that resist 
assimilation. 224 By contrast, Argentineans and Asian Indians often 
arrive with higher education degrees in hand and go on to achieve 
greater successes. 
In general, Asian immigrants seem more successful at economically 
integrating than Hispanics. Language ability may account for at least 
part of this discrepancy. Roughly the same percentage of Asians as 
Hispanics are recent immigrants. 225 However, almost half of foreign-
219 Brest & Oshige, supra note 5, at 866-67. 
220 Id. at 868-71 (describing benefits of affirmative action in eliminating stereotypes 
and creating positive minority role models). 
221 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 294-95 (1985). 
222 Brest & Oshige, supra note 5, at 873-74. The idea would be to target 
multi generational patterns of disadvantage that are due to (as opposed to merely 
correlative with) race or ethnicity. Id. 
223 See generally Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of 
Immigration Prisons in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577-606 (1998) (contrasting 
varying conditions met by Haitians versus Marielitos in 1980s); Anthony DePalma, 15 
Years on the Bottom Rung, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at Al (contrasting Greek and 
Mexican immigrant experiences). 
224 GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 182-83; DePalma, supra note 223. 
m Cf. U.s. Census Bureau, 2000 U.s. Census Data, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
homelsafflmain.html?_lang:en (click on "DATASETS," then click on "Census 2000 
Summary File 4 (SF 4) - Sample Data," and "Detailed Tables," then click on "United 
States," then click "Add," then click on "Show Result." Select "PCT38. AGE BY 
LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME BY ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE 
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born Hispanics lack the ability to function adequately in English 
compared to just over a quarter of their Asian counterparts.226 About 
one in five Hispanic immigrants speak English "not at all" compared 
to a mere 5.6% of Asians.m Accordingly, even legal Hispanic 
immigrants often remain excluded from opportunities for upward 
mobility. In addition, Hispanics do not seem to face the same barriers 
to spatial mobility as blacks, suggesting that their segregation is more 
a cultural choice than a condition of racism. 228 Second-generation 
Hispanics are also much more likely marry outside their racial groups 
than African Americans, suggesting less ingrained racial antipathy 
against them. 229 
Nonetheless, there are clearly some Hispanic communities that have 
been held back for generations at least partly due to racism. no 
Isolating the "racial" headwinds that impede ethnic advancement from 
other contingent variables requires making a number of subjective and 
normatively problematic assumptions about the dynamics of racial 
prejudice and the uncertain divide between culture and race, all of 
which would severely test our understanding of "race" as a 
construct. 231 Faced with such a demographic and sociological 
challenge, even the best social scientists given infinite time and 
resources might find it difficult to choose between competing claims 
of disadvantage in a way that would be generally accepted as fair. 232 
POPULATION 5 YEARS AND OVER [67)" and all tables until "PCT42. 
HOUSEHOULD LANGUAGE FOR LINGUISTIC ISOLATION [141." Then select 
"Asian alone" and "Hispanic or Latino (of any race)." Then select "Show Result." (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
226 See U.s. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 225. 
227 See id. 
228 See Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
893, 925 (1994); Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: The 
Perpetuation of the Underclass, in COLOR CLASS IDENTITY: THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE 
138-39 Oohn Arthur & Amy Shapiro eds., 1996). 
229 See GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 193. 
230 See Brest & Oshige, supra note 5, at 886-87 (citing conflicting evidence on links 
between Hispanic disadvantage and discrimination). 
231 Because race is itself a cultural phenomenon constructed intersubjectively, the 
boundaries between race and culture often blur. Other indicia of ethnic integration 
are subject to similar ambiguities. For example, rates of exogamy (interracial 
marriage) are often viewed as a negative indicator of prejudice, the ability to marry 
outside one's race being a proxy for societal integration. Yet, some groups exhibit 
preferences for endogamy for cultural reasons that have nothing to do with how 
outsiders view them. 
232 India's socioeconomic approach is by no means the only measure of societal 
subordination. However, alternative methodologies such as audit testing or attitudinal 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 338 2007-2008
338 University of California, Davis [Vol. 41:289 
Appreciating such difficulties provides a fuller explanation for the 
Court's antipathy toward societal rationales for affirmative action than 
the Court's stated reasons. Justices O'Connor and Powell stressed the 
"inherent [1 unmeasurab [ility 1" of past societal injuries. 233 However, 
these concerns also apply to an antisubordination model focused on 
the present. Moreover, while their comments focus on the limits of 
judicial competence, the ramifications extend beyond the judicial 
context. At the core lies a question of political, rather than merely 
technical, feasibility. An antisubordination approach to equality 
would be inherently subjective and contestable. Conditioning 
valuable societal benefits on such judgment calls, however well-
intentioned, would be a recipe for social discord. 
D. Politicization and Backlash 
In any case, in the real world, we should not expect that 
"disadvantage" would be determined through neutral social science 
because the whole process would inevitably become politicized. 
Competing interest groups would lobby for favorable criteria and 
attempt to "game" the system.234 Threshold standards would be hard 
to maintain. All of this has happened in India. 235 Reservation politics 
dominate election campaigns and attract corruption. New groups are 
constantly being added to the OBC ranks, but very few ever get taken 
off the lists.236 In this sense, the idealized account of Indian 
methodology provided by the amici scholars reqUires a dose of legal 
realism. Given the more complex and contestable terrain that the 
implementation of a "disadvantage model" in the United States would 
have to negotiate, one could expect the scope for politicization and 
manipulation of the process to increase dramatically. 
surveys have their own shortcomings and subjectivities whose details lie beyond the 
scope of this Article. Pager, supra note 156, at 114-17. Suffice it to say that a 
generalized assessment of societal hierarchies presents a daunting challenge by any 
method. 
233 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
234 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1317 (noting risk "of strategic and self-interested 
behavior"). 
235 Cunningham &: Menon, supra note 27, at 1306. 
236 See Sowell, supra note 93, at 50-51; With reservations, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 
2007, at 81, 83 ("Rather like guests at the Hotel California, those that join the [OBC 
reservation] list never leave - including one or two castes that were allegedly 
included by mistake."); see also Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.c. 447, 537-
38 (acknowledging political manipulation of OBC criteria for electoral advantage). 
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Fear of such "racial politics" underlies the Supreme Court's 
rejection of societal rationales. As Justice O'Connor tells us in Croson, 
the Court relies on strict scrutiny to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of 
race. "237 Without an objective metric to measure societal injuries, 
affirmative action would too easily devolve into a pretext for the 
politically empowered to "negotiate a 'piece of the action."'238 Justice 
Powell Similarly warns against "hitching the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause to ... the ebb and flow of political forces."239 It was 
to preempt such evils that the Court seemingly closed the door 
constitutionally to antisubordination arguments. 
We already see a politicization of the disparity testing that 
contracting programs do under Croson; critics have accused them of 
relying on phony social science to achieve predetermined ends.240 And 
as we saw, the process of creating our current racial categories was 
also not without its politics. Yet, disparity testing is confined to a 
particularized context and usually involves a contest between industry 
insiders, unbeknownst to the general public. Similarly, the racial 
prehistory of the quadrangle largely took place behind closed doors. 
By contrast, an Indian disadvantage model would elevate the Who 
Question to a much more visible plane. Determinations of 
"backwardness" involve a holistic assessment of group standing, not in 
a limited context, but across society. Such assessments inevitably pit 
competing groups against one another in an adversarial process. At 
stake is not just eligibility for one program in one sector, but 
affirmative action benefits across the board. The result is a far more 
competitive, high profile contest where the winners take all. 
Inevitably, caste consciousness becomes sharpened, not reduced, in 
the process. 241 
This may seem an acceptable price to pay in a country where caste 
identities have already been entrenched as an instrument of 
oppression over three thousand years. Yet, as we have seen, racial 
identities in the United States are not so well-defined. Moreover, as 
237 Richmond v.J,A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
238 Id. at 51O-1l. 
239 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265, 292,298 (1978). 
240 La Noue, supra note 54, at 12-13. 
241 Indeed, Indian commentators commonly lament the "Mandalization" of Indian 
politics (referring to the government commission expanded caste reservations 
nationally). Some link the rise of the Hindu right to the upper caste backlash against 
"Mandalism." See THOMAS B. HANSEN, THE SAFFRON WAVE: DEMOCRACY AND HINDU 
NATIONALISM IN MODERN INDIA 164-66 (1999); ACHIN VANAIK, THE FURIES OF INDIAN 
COMMUNALISM: RELIGION, MODERNITY AND SECURALIZA TlON 51, 319 (1997). 
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with our demographics, race presents a moving target. U.S. Census 
categories on race have changed dramatically over the years; they 
continue to be redefined today. 242 Such permeability of racial 
identities arguably has a positive value. Avoiding overt intergroup 
rivalries helps to minimize the hardening of such identities through 
forced political mobilizations. 
The competitive element of Indian affirmative action has other 
troubling features. Because more forward groups tend to usurp a 
lion's share of benefits, groups ranked lower down the hierarchy 
inevitably demand their own separate quotas. India already has two 
established tiers of beneficiaries, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
having precedence over the OBC. Competition within these groups 
has increasingly led to further distinctions whereby groups deemed 
"more disadvantaged" demand separate reservations, requiring ever 
more intricate rankings.243 Again, for a country dealing with the 
effects of an entrenched caste system, such inverted hierarchies may 
seem like an acceptable, even desirable remedy. South Africa has 
taken a similar approach: prioritizing affirmative action eligibility 
according to the degree of oppression that the various benefiCiary 
groups experienced under Apartheid (which was itself a rigidly 
hierarchical system). 244 
Cunningham has hypotheSized an analogous remedial hierarchy in 
which blacks and Native Americans - the two groups that suffered 
the greatest historical injury in the United States - would be first in 
line for affirmative action.245 Several U.5. courts have already hinted 
that equal protection may reqUire that such distinctions be made. 246 
242 YANOW, supra note 57, at 83-85 (charting evolution of categories). 
243 Sowell, supra note 93, at 34. 
244 Id. 
245 Cunningham, supra note 21, at 673 (drawing further analogy comparing blacks 
and Indians with, respectively, India's Scheduled Castes and Tribes). Cunningham 
stresses in a footnote that the analogy is made for illustrative purposes only, not as an 
"import model." Id. at 673 n.37. However, there is a logical case to be made for such 
a proposal. It's revealing, for example, that the SBA justified its minority set-asides by 
emphasizing the unique historical experience of these two groups. See La Noue &: 
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 450 (quoting SBA interim rule explaining "blacks had 
suffered 'enslavement and subsequent disfranchisement' and Indians had endured 
'near extermination,'" while omitting explanation of other included groups). 
246 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 n.50 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating "one 
would intuit that the minority group that has experienced the most discrimination ... 
would be entitled to the most benefit from the designated remedy"); Assoc. for 
Fairness in Bus. v. State, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.]. 2000) (same); Concrete 
Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1077 (D. Colo. 2000) 
(same). 
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Once racial disadvantage can be empirically quantified, the demand 
for differential remedies calibrated in proportion to the injury would 
become all but irresistible. Making such distinctions would only 
intensify intra-minority competition at all levels of the disadvantage 
ladder. 247 
The spectacle of so many groups competing in a collective airing of 
dirty linen would be one that many Americans would instinctively 
resist. Such special pleading runs strongly against the grain of 
American egalitarianism.248 Even from the start, when affirmative 
action was so clearly focused on redressing injustices against African 
Americans, policymakers were loathe to single out anyone group for 
preferential treatment. This reluctance to play favorites in favoritism 
appears to be widely shared, even among African Americans 
themselves. 249 Similarly, it is notable that claims based on Native 
American singularity have focused on reclaiming traditional 
homelands and privileges rather than the more general demand for 
societal preference voiced by other indigenous groups, for instance, in 
Malaysia or Fiji. 250 The United States likes to think of itself as a 
classless society and a nation founded on universal equality. However 
imperfectly that ideal has been applied in practice, we would likely be 
uncomfortable with a hierarchical system of affirmative action that so 
overtly belied it. 
The Who Question thus has its tradeoffs. Gains in distributive or 
corrective justice from pursuing increased precision and clarity might 
be outweighed by sharpened group consciousness and polarization.251 
247 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1317 (describing danger of "play[ing] the game of 
'more victimized than thou' "). 
248 Admittedly, affirmative action already requires a break from formal equality. 
However, it's easier to accept that "minorities" generally deserve a leg up than to 
engage a whole spectrum of claims to differential levels of entitlement. 
249 Studies have also shown that African Americans would be loathe to assume the 
stigma of being the only group singled out for special benefits. DAVID SABBAGH, U.N. 
DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEV. REPORT OFFICE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 26 n.148 (2004), available at http://hdr.undp.orgl 
docsipublicationslbackground_papersl2004IHDR2004_Daniel_Sabbagh.pdf. 
While African Americans have at times protested the diminishment of their share of 
the affirmative action pie due to competition from other groups, the dominant 
ideology espoused by black leaders is that of "solidarity" among "people of color." Id.; 
GRAHAM, supra note 32, at 5-6, 132. 
250 See generally Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 
WM. &: MARY L. REV. 1521, 1553-56 (2003) (describing preferences in Malaysia). 
251 Cunningham, supra note 21, at 675 (describing "[t]he concern that the fruit of 
'strict scrutiny' of group selection and definition might be a counter-productive 
perpetuation of racial identity"). 
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Justice Powell adverted to such concerns in Bakke when, after 
dismissing a sociological ranking of racial disadvantage as outside the 
judicial competence, he questioned whether such rankings would even 
be "politically feasible and socially desirable. "252 Powell's solution in 
Bakke was to a<;lvance a model of "pluses" awarded based on an 
individualized assessment of each applicant's diversity contribution. 
Powell's approach thus preserves a symbolic commitment to 
individualism, maintaining the illusion that everyone can compete 
equally with no group enjoying a superior a priori claim. 253 Likewise, 
Croson's disparity testing reduces group entitlement to a question of 
statistical analysis in particularized settings. The Supreme Court thus 
pursues a strategy of judicial indirection deSigned to disguise the 
workings of race consciousness and reduce the polarizing effects such 
policies engender. 254 It is not that the Court cannot choose between 
groups, but that it chooses not to. 
In this sense, critics of the Court may be correct to dismiss claims of 
"inherent unmeasurab [ility 1" as judicial hyperbole. However, they are 
too quick to accuse Justices O'Connor and Powell of haVing a hidden 
agenda. At root, the Court's concerns are pragmatic, rooted in the 
realm of practical politics rather than the kind of ideological hostility 
to race consciousness that critical race theorists often assume. 
Indeed, the lacuna in American law when it comes to the Who 
Question can be seen as part of a broader strategy of legal ambiguity in 
affirmative action rulings in which vagueness, if not an actual virtue, 
becomes a necessary evil. 255 On this account, the Court's apparent 
disregard of social context when it comes to affirmative action can be 
seen as a pragmatic accommodation of the political sensitivities 
surrounding race. It follows the old adage: "If you don't have 
something good to say, better say nothing at all.,,256 
252 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292, 297 (1978). 
253 See Pager, supra note 196, at 51-52 (drawing comparison with similar approach 
by European Court of Justice). 
254 See Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 4, 7 (1996); 
Daniel Sabbagh, The Judicial Uses of Subterfuge, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 411,419,433 (2003) 
(arguing "affirmative action ... being ... a deliberate attempt at reducing the degree 
of racial identification in the United States must be concealed in order to achieve its 
intended effect"). 
255 See Keith J. Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of 
Affirmative Action,34 LAw &: SOC'y REV. 263, 272-75 (2000) (summarizing 
commentary on judicial use of ambiguity in affirmative action). 
256 Critics have sometimes accused the Court of engaging in a form of subterfuge, a 
judicial shell game in which intentionally opaque rationales mask the realities of racial 
preferences. Kingsley R. Browne, Affirmative Action: Policy-Making by Deception, 22 
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Such intentional ambiguity runs directly contrary to the Indian 
approach of targeted reservations based on explicit reckonings of 
comparative societal disadvantage. Yet, as the preceding sections have 
argued, when it comes to the Who Question, too much clarity can 
prove counterproductive. Indeed, understanding this conflict between 
precision and polarization helps to explain the Supreme Court's 
preference for an antidiscrimination approach over antisubordination. 
A degree of ambiguity as to racial identities is tolerable within an 
antidiscrimination model because the doctrinal structure is symmetric: 
all racial classifications are equally suspect, redUcing the need for 
precise definitions as to categorical boundaries.257 A theory of equal 
protection that treats groups asymmetrically, however, favoring 
certain groups over others based on their perceived downtrodden 
status, puts a much greater premium on precise criteria to delineate 
who falls in which category. 
Limiting an antisubordination rationale to non-immigrant African 
Americans could, in theory, simplify matters. 258 However, a theory of 
equality focused solely on a single group seems unlikely to gain 
traction as a practical matter, even ignoring the constitutional 
challenges such a move would encounter. 259 Whether rightly or 
wrongly, affirmative action has always included other groups almost as 
a matter of reflex. Some argue the widespread acceptance of 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1291, 1291, 1294 (1996). Yet, intentionally opaque rulings are not 
always bad. They can serve as a judicial strategy to avoid entering unnecessarily 
divisive territory and preserve a space for political compromise. Pildes & Niemi, 
supra note 49, at 505-06; Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 
55 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 158 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 6, at l315. Powell's opinion in 
Bakke, for example, represents a carefully crafted formula that finesses the most 
objectionable and problematic aspects of affirmative action while appealing to 
symbolism around which Americans can unite. See Post, supra note 254, at 7; 
Sabbagh, supra note 254, at 433-34. 
257 Cf. Power, supra note 256, at 88 (describing symmetry/asymmetry distinction). 
258 There is certainly a strong case to be made for African American 
exceptionalism. Such an approach would find support in the legislative history of the 
Equal Protection Clause. K.G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National 
Policy, 2 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1992). Moreover, Supreme Court 
Justices and commentators have advanced it in the context of affirmative action. See 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, ]., 
dissenting); GRAHAM, supra note 32, at l32; ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF 
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS 192-93 (1998); 
Glenn C. Loury, Double Talk, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 23. 
259 See Pillai, supra note 258, at 34-36; see also Edley, supra note l31 (arguing 
Native Americans have even stronger claim to remedial justice than African 
Americans). 
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affirmative action has sprung directly from its pluralist nature. 260 
There is little to suggest we are ready to revisit such practices now. 261 
Indeed, the political economy of today's identity politics is 
increasingly stacked against it. 262 
An antisubordination approach thus makes the Who Question 
unavoidable. The ambiguity embraced through vague formulas such 
as "people of color" would dissolve in a highly public process of 
adjudicating competing claims. Even if such determinations were 
possible, they might come at a prohibitive social cost. Proponents of 
antisubordination theory often ignore such practical and prudential 
concerns, writing as if the victims of racial disadvantage were self-
evident. 263 They focus on doctrinal implications of the theory, while 
taking its feaSibility for granted. However, a theory of equality whose 
central concept cannot - or should not - be measured has 
questionable value. 
III. FINDING THE BALANCE 
This Article has suggested reasons to hesitate before pushing the 
Who Question too far. Such concerns provide a powerful argument 
against relying on societal disadvantage to select affirmative action 
beneficiaries directly. Moreover, they should give pause to those who 
advocate antisubordination as the controlling principle of equal 
protection review. 
That said, the impracticability of antisubordination as a stand-alone 
theory does not make it irrelevant to analyses of equality. The 
objections to antisubordination arise from second order concerns 
regarding implementation. The Court has taken societal remedies off 
the table because it fears an antisubordination approach would be 
unworkable, not because it objects on principle. As a result, its 
doctrinal preference for antidiscrimination should not preclude a 
senSibility to antisubordination values as a normative matter. Indeed, 
260 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
261 Cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 ("It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal 
protection permits the recognition [of Blacks as] special wards entitled to a degree of 
protection greater than that accorded others"). 
262 As African Americans have become outnumbered demographically by 
Hispanics, politicians increasingly compete for the latter's support. Likewise, the 
financial clout wielded by Asian Americans gives them a growing political voice. 
263 Sunstein offers a notable exception in explicitly distinguishing groups subject to 
discrimination, but not systemic subordination (e.g., Asian Americans, Jews) who 
thus fall outside his "anticaste principle." Sunstein, supra note 199, at 2443. 
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antisubordination and antidiscrimination ultimately represent two 
sides of a single coin. 264 
Moreover, the argument for ambiguity in affirmative action is based 
on a tradeoff between competing values, and where we draw the line is 
open to debate. The risk in raising the Who Question does not mean 
we should blithely accept the status quo. Indeed, recent case law 
threatens to make continued avoidance of the Who Question 
untenable. As lower courts continue to take a skeptical look at the 
categories used to allocate affirmative action remedies, the tradeoffs 
between clarity and ambiguity will need to be addressed. Even if 
India's methodology is not the answer to our Who Question, it might 
have more modest uses. 
A. Antisubordination After All 
Affirmative action constitutes an anomaly within equal protection 
doctrine: the rare instance in which race is relevant. As such, it 
remains notably undertheorized. 265 Our existing answers to the Who 
Question privilege method over meaning. Too often, we count heads 
without knowing whom we are counting or why. As a doctrinal 
matter, such formalism may be understandable. Yet, the narrowly 
circumscribed confines in which such doctrine is articulated should 
not blind us to the broader social context in which affirmative action 
operates. Antisubordination theory can help to fill this normative gap, 
eliminating needless ambiguities in existing doctrine. 
The value of such an approach is most obvious under remedial 
rationales for affirmative action. For example, Croson tells us that 
cities can justify remedial preferences by inferring discrimination from 
racial disparities. Some courts, however, have regarded such 
disparities as merely prima facie evidence that can be rebutted by 
showing an absence of racially discriminatory intent. 266 By this logic, 
racial disparities arising from entrenched "old boy networks" would 
264 Jack M. Balkin &: Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassijication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 13 (2003). 
265 Hollinger, supra note 100, at 31-32; Power, supra note 256, at 158-59. 
266 See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1066 
(D. Colo. 2000) (requiring disparity to be result of intentional discrimination). The 
court declined to draw an inference of actionable discrimination from disparity 
evidence where the evidence suggested non-racially motivated selection biases that 
may explain the disparities. Id. at 1070-71. The court also rejected anecdotal 
evidence of discrimination as Similarly attributable to non-racial motivations. Id. at 
1074. See also id., cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027, 1030-31 (2003) (Scalia, j., dissenting) 
(arguing inferences of discrimination are insufficient and actual proof is required). 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 346 2007-2008
346 University of California, Davis [Vol. 41:289 
not be actionable so long as its members discriminate based on insider 
status rather than race. 267 The fact that such practices perpetuate 
existing patterns of racial inequalities would be irrelevant so long as 
the inequalities sprang from sources of discrimination extrinsic to the 
context at hand. 268 
Viewing affirmative action through the lens of an antisubordination 
perspective would make such "rebuttals" untenable. The whole point 
of the remedy would be to overcome patterns of subordination. A 
showing of statistical disparities in the particularized context would 
still serve to meet Croson's demand for a measurable nexus between 
injury and remedy. However, the cause of the disparities need no 
longer be the focus of judicial inquiry. 269 
Moving from a "perpetrator's perspective" to a broader societal 
frame would eliminate much of the theoretical uncertainty that 
currently surrounds racially targeted remedies.270 Courts have 
struggled to reconcile the existence of such group remedies with the 
dominant reading of equal protection as an individual right. 271 As a 
group-based theory of equality, antisubordination would place group 
remedies on a more secure normative foundation. The result would 
be more straight forward doctrine that would bypass the need to 
pretend to find "actual victims" or villains,272 obviate concerns over 
state action,273 and eliminate the canard of the "innocent White.,,274 
267 In other words, such "old boys" would be deemed equal opportunity excluders. 
268 CJ. Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) (dismissing "dearth 
of minority participation [linked to I past societal discrimination in education and 
economic opportunities"). 
269 In other words, the "by whom" question would become irrelevant. 
270 Cf Freeman, supra note 161, at 30. 
271 See also Croson, 488 U.s. at 526-27 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting idea of 
group remedies entirely since victims of race discrimination can be identified by 
injury rather than their race). Compare Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States., 431 
U.S. 324, 364-67 (1977) (stating purpose of group remedy limited to reaching actual 
or potential victims of past discrimination), with Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l 
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.s. 421, 449-50, 477 (1986) (stating broader prospective goals of 
reforming internal dynamics to remove ongOing barriers to minority advancement). 
272 Cf Croson, 488 U.s. at 508 (perpetuating fiction of individualized review to 
eliminate group members who have not suffered personally); Concrete Works of 
Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1070 (D. Colo. 2000) (suggesting 
discrimination needs to be traced to identifiable wrongdoer in order to be actionable). 
273 Existing doctrine requires disparities be linked to state action. Since it is rare 
(post-Brown) for governments to engage directly in discrimination, theories of 
"passive participation" are needed to link private discrimination to state (in)action. 
See generally Ian Ayres &: Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify 
Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577 (1998) (exploring ambiguous 
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Evidence of entrenched barriers preventing certain groups from 
entering the relevant market would be justification enough. 
At the same time, the presumption that disparities imply 
discrimination should only apply to groups that are at least plausibly 
the victims of societal subordination. For example, if tomorrow 
Swedish contactors happened to be found statistically 
underrepresented in New York City, a court would hesitate to 
presume discrimination from such prima facie evidence because 
Swedes are not a racially subordinated group.275 This same logic 
should be extended to non-European groups for whom indicia of 
subordination is equally lacking. Newly arrived immigrants often find 
themselves included in affirmative action despite a lack of history of 
discrimination in the United States. They may be underrepresented 
for all sorts of reasons pertaining to their immigrant status; yet, we 
presume that race is the culprit. 276 
Particularly in economic contexts such as public contracting, there 
seems little justification for awarding blanket preference to 
socioeconomic overachievers such as East and South Asians.277 The 
same argument applies to Iberians and South Americans. This is not 
to deny that even successful minority groups encounter incidents of 
racial prejudice. However, existing discrimination law already affords 
nature and scope of passive participation rationales). By avoiding blame games, an 
antisubordination approach bypasses such theoretical and evidentiary complexities. 
274 Cj. Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the 
Anti-Affinnative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 445, 446 (2003) (critiquing myth of "innocent white" as affirmative 
action victim). One might still take account of injuries to settled expectations and 
avoid undue inflexibility in crafting a narrow tailored remedy. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). Yet, a full accounting of the social windfall 
conferred by white privilege would diffuse much of the moral force behind such 
concerns. See Harris, supra note 17, at 286-88. 
275 There is precedent for making such a distinction in the analogous context of 
disparate impact theory under Title VII. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and 
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 528 (2003). 
276 Immigrant underrepresentation may reflect unfamiliarity with u.s. customs, 
lack of social capital, linguistic hurdles, etc. - things that have nothing to do with 
race and can be expected to disappear with the passage of time. See GRAHAM, supra 
note 32, at 132 (describing inclusion of immigrants as "a historical accident for which 
there is no possible justification"); see also EDLEY, supra note 131, at 176 (relying on 
assumption of risk rationale); PATTERSON, supra note 258, at 193. 
217 See, e.g., Timothy Bates, The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A 
Comparative Analysis of Asian, Nonminority, and Black-Owned Businesses, 18 REV. 
BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 26 (1989) ("Asians are not a disadvantaged group: their 
eligibility for government minority business set-aside[sl . . . is completely 
inappropriate.") . 
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them retrospective relief. 278 The mere possibility of localized 
discrimination does not justify entitlement to a proactive remedy in 
the absence of systemic bias. Arab Americans also face discrimination, 
as do Hasidic Jews. But these groups are generally denied affirmative 
action because our current racial orthodoxy deems them white. Such 
classificatory formalism aside, on what basis can Spaniards or South 
Asians justify being treated differently?279 The extraordinary remedy 
of voluntary affirmative action should be reserved for those who face 
more intractable racial barriers. It is the need to proactively root out 
such entrenched hierarchies that ultimately provides the most 
persuasive justification for affirmative action. 
Making such distinctions obviously requires some ability to assess 
societal disadvantage. Formal determinations as to which groups 
qualify as subordinated would be problematic for the reasons stated 
above. Identifying groups who are unquestionably not subordinated, 
however, would be much easier and less controversiaP8o A more 
modest use of Indian methodology would therefore be to rely on 
societal data to rule out groups that are clearly not being held back on 
account of race and focus on those that might be. Such societal 
assessments could thus serve as a threshold test to refine the 
categories we count with in particularized contexts. 281 
For example, the dispute described above as to whether Iberians 
should count as Hispanic is one that almost every jurisdiction faces: 
deciding who qualifies as a "minority." A societal disadvantage 
perspective, even if imperfect, would at least provide a metric to draw 
definitional lines that would be preferable to the uninformed intuition 
of judges and federal bureaucrats. 282 Even minor improvements in 
existing definitions could help to prevent the benefits of affirmative 
action from being disproportionately consumed by those who need 
them least. 
278 State and federal laws provide a panoply of statutory remedies to address 
proven instances ofracial discrimination. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.s.c. 
§ 2000e-17 (2000); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284,82 Stat. 81 (2007). 
279 Cj. Sunstein, supra note 199, at 2443 (equating Asian Americans with Jews). 
280 It is hardly stigmatizing to label a group as "advantaged." A relatively high 
threshold could be set so that no one falling on the "advantaged" side of the line could 
credibly claim the contrary. 
281 Thus, rather than using societal disadvantage to determine eligibility directly, 
we would apply such data at an initial definitional stage to reconstruct the basic 
categories by which beneficiaries are identified based on underrepresentation. 
282 Cj. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1313-14 (urging emphasis on empirical facts in 
resolving affirmative action disputes). 
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Iberians represent an easy case being as much European as Hispanic. 
However, it is time to challenge presumptions of affirmative action 
eligibility that turn solely upon "non-white" status. Counting heads 
using categories confined to at least plausibly disadvantaged minority 
groups would make Croson's blind equation of underrepresentation 
with discrimination far more tenable. 
Implementation of this "subordination-light" approach need not 
entail formalized rankings a la India, nor indeed should the 
socioeconomic data be treated as dispositive. In fact, the problem with 
India's approach may have as much to do with its reliance on high-
profile, winner-takes-all contests as with its underlying aims. As a 
starting point, we could begin merely by gathering the necessary data 
and funding social science research to interpret it. Such research 
should also examine more carefully the links between immigration 
and ethnic disadvantage to help control for immigration effects and 
enable a more meaningful debate on immigrant participation in 
affirmative action. 283 Policy responses to the findings that emerge 
could then be determined on a program-by-program basis, primarily 
through legislative and/or administrative initiative rather than judicial 
fiat. 
The relevance of an antisubordination perspective to a diversity 
rationale for affirmative action is less obvious, if only because diversity 
remains an amorphous concept embracing multiple aims. 284 These 
aims point in different directions as to the beneficiary groups you 
might select. 285 Grutter's recent embrace, however, of a broader vision 
283 See Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants: The Unintended 
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LiNES, supra note 50, at 54-55 (noting dearth of 
scholarly analysis or empirical data exploring connections between immigration and 
affirmative action). 
284 Justice Powell's original account of diversity in Bakke emphasized the heuristic 
benefits of bringing diverse viewpoints into the classroom. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.s. 306, 324-25 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265, 
313 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). Grutter shifts the focus from benefits to students 
to benefits to society at large by cultivating "a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes 
of the citizenry." Id. at 332. Along the way, Grutter also defends diversity as 
providing a civics lesson in "cross-racial understanding," a response to globalization, 
and a public service to corporate recruiters. Id. at 308. 
285 For example, should foreign-born immigrants count for diversity purposes? It 
depends on what you think "diversity" is designed to accomplish. If it's to expose 
students to a kind of model United Nations which helps them compete in the global 
marketplace, then the more immigrants the better. And why limit it to immigrants of 
color? Alternatively, if it's the "unique experience of being a racial minority" in the 
United States that we seek to bring into the classroom, then immigrants may not serve 
the purpose as well, if their formative years were spent elsewhere. Grutter, 539 U.s. at 
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of diversity as an agent of societal legitimization and its explicit 
acknowledgement that "race unfortunately still matters" suggests that 
a societal disadvantage approach could feature prominently in the 
diversity context as well. 286 If nothing else, a subordination 
perspective offers a principled basis for privileging racial diversity 
above all other sources. 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, incorporating an 
antisubordination perspective has important implications for other 
aspects of equal protection as well. As others have noted, 
antidiscrimination discourse often "conceals other values that do 
much of the work." 287 Acknowledging the relevance of 
antisubordination values could resolve doctrinal uncertainties such as 
whether whites can bring disparate impact actions under Title vn288 
and whether discriminatory intent is actionable in a remedial 
context. 289 
B. India Revisited - A la Carte 
India's example suggests further grounds for improvement on 
current practice. For example, even if we continue to count heads 
under an underrepresentation model, it would not hurt to follow the 
Indian practice of disaggregating categories to their logical limit. 
Where underrepresentation is measured on a national scale, it makes 
no sense to collect data using only a few broad racial categories. 29o 
333. As noted, this has become a controversial question. See supra text 
accompanying notes 64-65. 
286 Grutter, 539 U.s. at 332-33. 
287 Balkin &: Siegel, supra note 264, at 13. 
288 In one view, disparate impact claims function as merely a procedural device to 
flush out hidden bias. The more robust interpretation sees disparate impact as serving 
an antisubordination function by eliminating the structures of racial hierarchy 
whether intentional or not. See Primus, supra note 275, at 527-29. Endorsing this 
latter view would obviously restrict the class of potential beneficiaries. 
289 In general, equal protection forbids government action that is intended to 
benefit certain racial groups at the expense of others. Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.s. 252,267 (1977). However, recent case law has suggested 
that race-neutral forms of affirmative action might fall outside this rule, despite being 
intentionally deSigned to benefit underrepresented minorities. See Primus, supra note 
275, at 540 (citing dicta in Croson and Grutter). An antisubordination viewpoint 
would legitimize such asymmetrical treatment. 
290 Incredibly, the federal government's most recent disparity study did not even 
bother to disaggregate that far. See Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal 
Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042 (May 23, 1996) (calculating underrepresentation of 
"minorities" as single mass). 
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Even in local contexts, where particular ethnic groups have a strong 
presence and a distinct identity, cities should consider counting them 
separately where possible.291 
Working with narrower categories would minimize definitional 
ambiguities. It's much easier to agree on who is Iberian. or 
Argentinean than who is Hispanic, as national origin provides a stable 
reference point. 292 Counting with smaller units would also permit 
more narrowly tailored remedies to be drawn, preventing Iberians 
from usurping benefits at the expense of Puerto Ricans. The converse 
could also be true: groups now excluded from affirmative action -
Samoans and Laotians in the context of higher education - might 
benefit from being counted separately. 
Some universities already make such distinctions. The University of 
Hawaii targets only selected Asian Pacific subgroups for diversity 
admissions. Stanford University limits Hispanic eligibility to Chicanos 
and Puerto Ricans.293 The University of Texas used to exclude African 
American immigrants. Such practices should be expanded. 
This is not to deny the relevance of broader racial identities or to 
attempt to replace race with ethnicity.294 It is simply to recognize that 
the fault lines of prejudice may only imperfectly track popular 
conceptions of race and may vary in ways that are contextually 
contingent. Disaggregation would also challenge the assumption that 
the quadrangle represents the only organizing paradigm by which race 
can be viewed, undermining monolithic assumptions about racial 
identities and perhaps helping us to transcend them. 
India's example also underscores the importance of attentiveness to 
local context.295 Affirmative action categories should reflect patterns 
of regional disadvantage, even if this means departing from 
quadrangular conventions. French Acadians have a history in 
Louisiana that justifies distinguishing them from whites. Likewise, 
291 In other words, choose the narrowest categories of ethnic identity to which the 
sOciopathology of stereotyping and discrimination might conceivably be responsive 
and for which statistically meaningful results can be obtained. 
292 There would admittedly still be definitional challenges posed by multiple 
migrations. Cf Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(accepting descendant of non-Hispanic Jews born and raised in Argentina as bona fide 
Hispanic). However, such inevitable controversies can be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis. 
293 Brest &: Oshige, supra note 5, at 855. 
294 Data compiled based on subgroups can always be reconstituted to provide a 
picture of the larger group. 
295 Cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (noting context matters in 
racial equality cases). 
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counting Native Hawaiians separately makes sense in Hawaii. Even 
nonethnic groups such as Appalachian whites may deserve special 
attention. 296 
We've been painting our racial landscape in primary colors for too 
long. It's time to take a more chromatically differentiated view that 
takes note of the ever more diverse spectrum of hues represented in 
our citizenry. India's example offers a useful starting point to 
accomplish this. 
C. The Meta-Question: Who Decides? 
Perhaps the more pressing challenge, however, is not to decide how 
to answer the Who Question, but who should decide. In allocating 
decisional authority between courts and political actors, India again 
offers an instructive example. 
From an institutional standpoint, the construction of beneficiary 
categories is better suited to legislative and administrative bodies than 
to courts. The former have superior fact-finding capabilities and 
democratic legitimacy in order to balance competing policy interests 
and arrive at a comprehensive solution.297 By contrast, as Justice 
Powell noted, courts are not institutionally suited to perform the 
"variable sociological . . . analysis" to evaluate questions of 
comparative racial entitlement. 298 
Yet, the Supreme Court has blocked legislative efforts to enact 
societal remedies in part because it fears such remedies could devolve 
into a racial spoils systems that it would be unable to control. 299 The 
Who Question is thus caught in a Catch-22. While courts remain 
loathe to tackle the imponderables of race and are ill-equipped to do 
so, strict scrutiny permits little leeway for them to defer to anybody 
else. The result has been a tenuous stalemate in which the Court has 
only partly constitutionalized the Who Question while remaining 
silent on its definitional aspects. Meanwhile, in the absence of judicial 
prodding, political actors lack any incentive to depart from the status 
quo. 
The price of avoidance and ambigUity at the top has been judicial 
incoherence below. While the Supreme Court can rely on docket 
control to avoid answering awkward questions, lower courts have no 
such luxury. Their efforts to dispose of definitional challenges have 
296 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
297 Sunstein, supra note 199, at 2440. 
298 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.s. 265, 297 (1978). 
299 See Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469, 510-11 (1989). 
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been almost farcicapoo Moreover, given the hydraulic pressure 
exerted by strict scrutiny to constitutionalize questions of race, the 
doctrinal lacuna bequeathed by the Supreme Court appears untenable. 
As we have seen, lower courts are increasingly challenging definitional 
assumptions underlying affirmative action under the rubric of narrow 
tailoring. 301 
Further constitutionalization of the Who Question is doomed to 
failure. Defining racial boundaries does not lend itself to precise 
judicial standards. Race is messy. To normalize it within fixed 
categories requires imposing an artificial rigidity on inherently fluid 
identities.302 Such arbitrary decisions are not the sort of thing that can 
be easily justified under strict scrutiny.303 
When it comes to constructing categories, is there an alternative 
between these equally unpalatable extremes of abdication and 
constitutionalization? India's solution demonstrates a useful 
midpoint, it defers most of the aspects of the Who Question to 
administrative processes that operate only indirectly under judicial 
supervision. Although the Indian Supreme Court remains an active 
protagonist in shaping the constitutional doctrine governing caste 
reservations, the court has recognized that the selection of affirmative 
action beneficiaries is primarily a political decision. It has confined 
the role of the judiciary to articulating principles that bind the exercise 
of such political discretion and ensure that selection processes are 
conducted in an objective, transparent manner, pursuant to 
established standards.304 
There is already a precedent in U.s. equality law for this kind of 
"hands-off' approach to category making in the case law on race-
conscious voter districting.305 The U.s. Supreme Court has recognized 
300 See supra notes 75-88, 137-40 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 72-74, 88, 92, 117-18, 122-23, 131-36 and accompanying text. 
302 See YANOW, supra note 57, at viii, 150; cf Jenkins, supra note 25, at 67-68 
(making similar argument regarding classification of identities generally). 
303 If every disgruntled plaintiff can force a City to muster compelling evidence to 
justify its choice of affirmative action categories with respect to every possible 
subgroup, whether included or omitted, strict review would become effectively fatal in 
fact, contrary to Adarand's assurances. The challenge is to find a principled stopping 
point short of that. 
304 See Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.c. 447, 558-59 (India) (endorSing 
proposed weighting of 11 socioeconomic factors as meeting constitutional 
requirement of "objective" assessment of caste disadvantage, while not precluding 
comparable alternatives); see also Cunningham et al., supra note 25, at 876-77. 
305 Race-conscious voter districting is itself the political equivalent of affirmative 
action. See Farber, supra note 228, at 925. 
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that drawing election district lines is a political exercise in which 
courts should hesitate to intervene.306 Instead, the Court will apply 
strict scrutiny only where racial considerations so override "traditional 
districting principles" that a racial gerrymander becomes manifest.307 
u.s. courts could undertake a similar role with respect to the Who 
Question: requiring only that affirmative action categories be chosen 
through a transparent process and conform to minimum standards of 
rationality and impartiality. Judicial interventions would be justified 
only when the results are manifestly inconsistent with these basic 
guidelines or otherwise exhibit indicia of favoritism.308 The equivalent 
of "traditional districting principles" could gradually develop in 
common law fashion. As a starting point, some of the suggestions this 
Article has made could be adopted: for example, requiring 
disaggregation into subcategories where feasible, eliminating 
"forward" groups, controlling for immigration effects, and focusing on 
regional context. 309 Courts have already begun to tinker with several 
such steps.3lO This proposal would merely unify their efforts under a 
coherent doctrinal framework. As with the voter districting cases, the 
scope of such judicial review might prove erratic, although perhaps no 
worse than the status quo. In any case, this Article has already 
suggested that when it comes to the Who Question, there are benefits 
to ambiguity as well as costs.311 
CONCLUSION 
Affirmative action sits at the fault line between two diverging 
readings of equal protection. Existing doctrine configured around 
antidiscrimination theory remains incomplete, and continuing to 
count heads using outdated and overinclusive categories perpetuates 
an arbitrary and unfair distribution of benefits. If we are going to 
continue to select affirmative action beneficiaries by the numbers, we 
need to think about counting the ones that matter most. 
306 See Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.s. 900,905 (1995). 
307 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.s. 630,646-47 (1993). 
308 Cj. Jana-Rock Constr. Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 212-
14 (2d Cir. 2006) (scrutinizing construction of Hispanic category for signs of 
favoritism). 
309 See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 92, 117-18, 131-36 and accompanying text. 
311 Cj. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1315-16 (describing benefits of Supreme Court's 
"casuistical, rule-free, fact-specific course in the context of affirmative action" as 
simultaneously provoking public debate through incremental rulings while leaving 
space for democratic resolution of underlying issues). 
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Yet, understanding the limitations inherent in the Who Question 
can also help us to appreciate the tradeoffs involved in shifting to an 
antisubordination model. Any explicit effort to target racial 
hierarchies would have to overcome ambiguous group identities, 
shifting demographies, and inevitable politicization. Gains in 
distributive and corrective justice could be outweighed by sharpened 
group consciousness and racial polarization. This Article argued for 
an integration of antidiscrimination and antisubordination values and 
offered some practical suggestions to that end in the context of the 
Who Question. Ultimately, however, the answer may lie in a 
reallocation of decisional authority between the judiciary and the 
political branches as much as any doctrinal synthesis. In both 
respects, India offers an instructive model that we can usefully 
consider, both to emulate - and to avoid. 
H
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Education 
Population % Earning Degree 
Population Group Size Bachelors Graduate 
ALL U.S. 281,421,906 15.5% 8.8% 
BLACK 34,658,190 9.5% 4.8% 
Jamaican 736,513 13.3% 7.0% 
ASIAN 10,242,998 26.7% 17.3% 
Asian Indian 1,645,510 29.6% 34.3% 
Japanese 795,051 28.7% 13.1% 
Chinese 2,422,970 24.1% 23.8% 
Korean 1,072,682 29.1% 14.6% 
Vietnamese 1,110,207 14.5% 4.8% 
Samoan" 85,243 7.5% 3.0% 
Tongan" 27,686 7.3% 1.3% 
Laotian 167,792 6.3% 1.4% 
Cambodian 178,Q43 6.9% . 2.2% 
HISPANIC 35,305,818 6.7% 3.8% 
Spaniard 112,999 16.2% 13.7% 
Portuguese 1,176,615 13.0% 6.0% 
South American 1,419,979 14.5% 10.6% 
Argentinean 107,275 16.2% 19.0% 
Cuban 1,249,820 11.5% 9.6% 
Central American 1,811,676 6.2% 3.4% 
Puerto Rican 3,403,510 8.3% 4.2% 
Mexican 20,900,102 5.0% 2.4% 
LEBANESE 440,279 24.3% 17.0% 
~RSI~ 
-----
~ 33~, 266 29.7')/,_ ~27.5'lL 
'Not included in Asian totals 
Q~~!JpatiQn Property 
Managerial or Median Home Home 
Professional Value Ownership 
33.6% $119,600 66.2% 
25.2% $80,600 46.3% 
30.1% $126,900 49.6% 
44.6% $199,300 53.2% 
59.9% $210,200 46.9% 
50.6% $238,300 60.8% 
52.2% $232,200 58.4% 
38.7% $209,500 40.0% 
26.9% $151,400 53.2% 
18.6% $153,200 34.4% 
13.3% $149,100 48.1% 
13.3% $100,500 52.4% 
17.8% $120,800 43.6% 
18.1% $105,600 45.7% 
42.0% $162,100 57.0% 
29.9% $160,100 64.9% 
27.7% $153,100 41.2% 
425% $180,000 51.9% 
31.6% $135,700 58.0% 
13.3% $131,400 31.7% 
24.2% $112,500 34.0% 
14.9% $95,300 48.0% 
45.9% $159,000 68.9% 
_ 52.8% ... _ 
-
$268,lQQ. 58.7% 
- --
Income 
Median Family % Below 
Income Poverty Level 
$50,046 12.4% 
$33,255 24.9% 
$44,668 13.5% 
$59,324 12.6% 
$70,708 9.8% 
$70,849 9.7% 
$60,058 13.5% 
$47,624 14.8% 
$47,103 16.0% 
$41,091 20.2% 
$46,261 19.5% 
$43,542 18.5% 
$35,621 29.3% 
$34,397 2/..6% 
$53,002 12.7% 
$55,100 8.1% 
$42,824 15.0% 
$53,689 13.8% 
$42,642 15.0% 
$34,150 19.9% 
$32,791 26.0% 
$33,516 23.5% 
$63,499 8.6% 
_$69,590 10.3% 
Source: 2000 U.s. Census 
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